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This thesis explores a conceptual understanding of dialogue within a community of 
practice.  It argues that meaningful conversations are at the core of critical, reflective, 
and analytical praxis, and that a critical understanding holds transformative possibilities 
for teaching and learning.  Aspects of western and ethnic paradigms and their 
theoretical constructs, which may either enhance or hinder current practices, are 
identified, as are elements that arise from several case studies drawn from a large 
banking organisation operating out of South Africa.  It is hoped that an evaluation of the 
research findings will provide a basis for an understanding of dialogue within a local 
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“The first known conversationalist was Socrates, who replaced words [with] dialogue.  Perhaps 
he did not invent dialogue, which was originally a Sicilian mime or puppet play, but he 
introduced the idea that individuals could not be intelligent on their own, that they needed 
someone else to stimulate them.  Before him, the model for all speech was the monologue: the 
wise man or god spoke and the rest listened.  But Socrates had been through the trauma of 
studying science and had been left with the feeling that he would never know what to believe.  
His brilliant idea was that if two unsure individuals were put together, they could achieve what 
they could not do separately: they could discover the truth, their own truth, for themselves.  By 
questioning each other and examining their prejudices, dividing each one of these into many 
parts, finding the flaws, never attacking or insulting, but always seeking what they could agree 
between them, moving in small steps from one agreement to another, they would gradually 
learn what the purpose of life was.  Wandering through Athens, through the markets and 
meeting places, Socrates demonstrated how dialogue worked, accosting artisans and politicians 
and people of all callings, questioning them about their work and opinions.  Whatever they 
happened to be doing at the moment, they must have a reason, they must think it was right or 
just, or beautiful; so he led the discussion to what those words meant.  He argued that it was 
inadequate simply to repeat what others said, to borrow beliefs.  One had to work them out for 
oneself.  He was a teacher such as had never existed before, who refused to teach, who 
refused to be paid, insisting that he was as ignorant as the pupil, and that the way to find a 
reason for living was to engage in conversation.” 
 
 
Theodore Zeldin. (2000: 7). An Intimate History of Humanity 
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I developed an increasing interest in dialogue as a technique for engaging adults in the 
processes of furthering their continuous education, training and development when, 
during my initial research, it was revealed that multinational organisations across a 
number of diverse disciplines had begun to experiment with dialogue as a core 
business process, with some powerful results (Isaacs, 1999:20).   I was particularly 
drawn to studies conducted by William Isaacs, whose work has been strongly 
influenced by quantum theorist David Bohm, in which experiments with dialogue “as a 
core process in self-governing within large institutions” (Isaacs, 1999: xvii, emphasis 
mine), had been used. 
 
In delving further into the available literature I discovered that dialogue within 
organisations was being understood as a way of “improving our thought processes, 
especially in groups where the solution depends on people reaching at least a common 
formulation of the problem” (Schein, 1993: 27), and that it “holds promise as a way of 
helping groups reach higher levels of consciousness and thus be more creative and 
more effective” (pg. 27).  Edgar Schein also describes dialogue as “different from many 
other techniques that have been proposed before” (pg. 27), lays claim to evidence that 
“it has considerable promise as a problem-formulation and problem-solving philosophy 
and technology” (pg. 27), and sees it as a necessary vehicle for “understanding 
cultures and subcultures”. He contends “that organisational learning will ultimately 
depend upon such cultural understanding” (pg. 27).  I was intrigued to learn more, 
particularly in view of my own immediate context. 
 
As an educator, working for a leading corporate banking organisation operating out of 
South Africa, the need for exploring alternative avenues to develop competencies 
among workers leading to critical thinking, self organising, personal mastery, and the 
ability to communicate effectively and independently, had become a priority for me.  
The results of independent customer satisfaction surveys were beginning to show that, 
despite a proliferation of in-house training initiatives and interventions, there was little 
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evidence to suggest that workers were able to successfully integrate learning transfer 
into the complex, integrated and systems-oriented workplace environment.  Whilst 
there was strong, measurable, and empirical evidence to show that workers knew their 
basic product and systems by ‘rote’, they appeared to lack the ability to respond to 
challenges requiring them to apply their knowledge across organisational structures 
and operational divisions formed by functions of administration, marketing, finance, 
sales, product development, and those imposed by geographical boundaries. 
 
I discovered that these were not unusual or isolated problems, particularly within 
today’s business environment where organisations are said to have traversed ‘the 
global village’ where everything has become connected with everything else, and 
where global trends, such as “accelerating change, complexity, uncertainty, and 
interdependence” (Joiner, 2002: 1), were seen to impact even the most ‘local’ of 
businesses and communities.  Joiner describes the results of a particular study using 
“pivotal conversations” as a means of overcoming organisational barriers created 
through the operation of “functional silos” across divisions of work, and the 
establishment of integrated process design initiatives that had “a large impact on key 
process outcomes, such as revenue-generation, cost, quality, and timeliness” (pg. 2).  
Is this what was needed in my own organisation?  Was it possible to use dialogue as 
an effective means of facilitating the necessary change required by local workplace 
challenges?  And, most intriguingly, was there a particular kind of dialogue, different to 
the one that I had become familiar with?  
 
It had already become clear to me that what was needed was an entirely different way 
of seeing and doing things.  The prospect of experimenting with a new kind of dialogue 
as an alternative means of engaging with workers to explore with them the root cause 
of the problem, and to investigate another avenue of achieving teaching success using 
Isaacs’s research findings as a ‘working-model’, became increasingly attractive. 
 
In turning to Isaacs’s work on dialogue, which is regarded by many as a virtual 
organisational treatise on “the art of thinking together”, the practice of dialogue is 
defined as “a living experience of inquiry within and between people” (Isaacs, 1999: 9), 
and in which Isaacs argues that the process of dialogue has application for ourselves, 
our relationships, our organisations, and our communities.  According to Isaacs, 
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dialogical inquiry provided a platform for resolving conflict; for creating and generating 
effectiveness; and for achieving breakthroughs in organisational productivity and 
performance. Further, it was seen as a means of harnessing collective intelligence, 
fostering communication and understanding, suspending assumptions, and proposing 
a cogent methodology for sustaining partnership, in that “dialogue offers a route for 
understanding and effectiveness that goes to the heart of human beings – the 
meanings we make, and the thinking and feeling that underlies what we do, individually 
and together” (Isaacs, 1999: 10-12). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement: 
 
At the heart of Isaacs’s raison d’être is the belief that dialogue, as practiced today, has 
somehow lost its cogency and effectiveness, in that individuals no longer know “how to 
think or talk together in a way that summons up our deeply held common sense, 
wisdom, and potential” (Isaacs, 1999: 2; see also Senge, 1990: 10).  The underlying 
problem, expressed as being partly the lack of personal capability and partly the larger 
context in which we live, was seen both as our inability to “recognise the undercurrents 
beneath the surface of conversations” (pg. 2), and “a symptom of a larger set of 
fragmenting forces not just resident in the body politic but in the culture of humanity as 
a whole” (pg. 2).  Isaacs argues for the hypothesis that, if dialogue is to regain some of 
its effectiveness, “then what is needed is a powerful set of practical tools and practices 
that can help us deal with both dimensions” (pg. 3).  These tools “must let us produce 
pragmatic, successful results out of difficult conversations … and at the same time they 
must call forth and help us address these fragmentary forces by helping us integrate 
the good, the true, and the beautiful within each of us and within the larger institutions 
in which we live” (pg. 3). 
 
Isaacs’s contention, as we have already seen earlier, is supported by Schein (1993), 
who believes that “the ultimate reason for learning about the theory and practice of 
dialogue … is that it facilitates and creates new possibilities for valid communication … 
[I]f problem solving and conflict resolution in groups is increasingly important in our 
complex world, then the skill of dialogue becomes one of the most fundamental of 
human skills” (Schein, 1993: 28). 
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I also found it interesting to discover that, while Isaacs, Schein and others (Bohm, 
1990; Ellinor and Gerard, 1998; Senge, 1990) were drawing my attention to the idea of 
a particular theory and practice for dialogue, their claims that the current and 
contemporary use of dialogue was not working appeared to be supported by 
independent research conducted by Fenwick and Rubenson (2005).  Their research 
findings show that the use of what they call ‘sense-making’ methodologies, such as 
those associated with group critical reflection, dialogue and inquiry, are rarely being 
used in organisations today because “individuals are disillusioned with such practices” 
(pg. 7), and feel that the use of these methods “fails to sufficiently account for power 
relations in workplaces and knowledge hierarchies” (pg. 7). 
 
As an educator who advocates ‘communicative competence’, which is “to apply 
rationality to dialogue” (Mezirow, 1991: 69), as the quintessence of self-direction in 
adults, I became increasingly absorbed by the suggestion, on the one hand, that 
current practices of dialogue were failing and that what was needed was a renewed 
theory and practice of dialogue and, on the other hand, that the lack of dialogical 
engagement within organisations today may account for their apparent loss of critical 
thinking skills, such as what appeared to be the case in my own organisation.  Within 
this context dialogue began to take on new meaning, strengthened by the view of 
Mezirow who believed that “because critical reflection is a process of testing and the 
justification or validity of taken-for-granted premises, the role of dialogue becomes 
salient” (Mezirow et al, 1990: 354).   
 
I began to wonder whether what was being said about dialogue could be relevant to 
South Africa, and was surprised to learn that there have been no specific tests 
contrasting the effects of differing methods of communication carried out within this 
country. 
 
1.3 The Importance, Purpose And Aim Of The Research: 
 
The overall intent of my research project is to make a contribution (however small) to 
adult and organisational learning and to improve educational practice (Parlett, Dearden 
and Rowland, quoted in Hammond, 1989: 108).  In this context, as Hammond 
poignantly reminds us, the aim of the project is not to presume to offer any one ‘truth’ 
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about dialogue, but to “find ways to focus on aspects of the picture which were not 
previously known, or to look at a familiar aspect from a new angle, and to share our 
insights with others who may benefit from or enjoy learning about it” (Hammond, 1989: 
110). 
 
To this end, the specific aims of the research project are: 
 To conduct a critical review of the literature dealing with dialogue in 
organisations and elsewhere in order to provide an understanding of what 
dialogue means and what dialogue is within organisational contexts; 
 To investigate whether existing models of dialogical practice within 
organisations, as suggested by the literature review, will be easily replicated 
within the South African environment and context; 
 
Schein (1993) argues that at the root of complex problems, potentially volatile issues 
and corporate decision-making lie “communication failures and cultural 
misunderstandings that prevent the parties from framing the problem in a common 
way, and thus make it impossible to deal with the problem constructively” (Schein, 
1993: 27).  He suggests that, for this reason, dialogue ought to be “a central element in 
any model of organisational change” (pg. 27). 
 
The importance of this research project, therefore, is to examine our skill to 
communicate in such a way that processes of testing, validation and critical discourse 
itself are made clear.  Its purpose is to reflect on the use of dialogue within 
organisational learning contexts to ask questions relating to its efficacy and best 
practice. 
 
1.4 Research Questions: 
 
In order to do so I pose the following questions to serve as the central focus in this 
study –  
 
 What is dialogue? 
 
 How does dialogue occur within an organisation operating in South Africa? 
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Underlying these questions are others that, although they do not form the central focus 
of the study, nevertheless serve to help me to provide additional impetus for my study: 
What does the dialogic form look like?  What does it resemble?  Is the theory and 
practice of dialogue being advocated by Isaacs (1996) and Schein (1993) possible to 
replicate within the South African context?  What benefit will it bring to a South African 
organisation?  Is there a distinctly African form of dialogue?  If so, what does it look 
like?  And is it likely to influence how South African organisations experience dialogue?   
 
 







I found the general literature on dialogue, in some respects, to be quite voluminous, 
and I agree with Nichol (quoted in Bohm, 1996), whose own enquiry into dialogue led 
him to the acknowledgement that “in recent times a profusion of practices, techniques, 
and definitions has arisen around the term” (pg. xv).  Moreover, I discovered that there 
was a plethora of literary articles and works emanating from a profusion of activities 
claiming dialogue as their raison d’être but which, in reality, are nothing more than trials 
or experiments, which Senge (1990) describes as “a product of circumstance rather 
than systematic effort or disciplined practice” (pg. 222).  I have ignored these 
contributions and therefore exclude them from the literature review for practical 
purposes. 
 
In addition, I have given particular emphasis to the literature which addresses the issue 
of dialogue as framed within the context of organisational learning and culture.  Where 
necessary I have attempted to explore converging areas of interest, such as those 
associated with critical social theory, quantum theory, communities of practice, and the 
like, though I have deliberately limited my enquiry to focus upon perspectives which 
have a direct impact on our understanding of dialogue only, without attempting to offer 
a full exposition of the relevant field of research itself.      
 
2.2 What Is Dialogue? 
 
2.2.1 Introduction:  
[A historical perspective] 
 
I am inclined to agree with Ellinor and Gerard who posit the theory that “dialogic 
communication in some form has been in existence ever since the dawn of humanity 
… otherwise language and culture could not have developed” (Ellinor and Gerard, 
1998: 28).  Ellinor and Gerard maintain that “shared meanings form the bedrock of 
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social behaviours, which include things such as spiritual practices, artefacts, 
architecture, art, symbols, and, of-course, ways of speaking together” (pg. 28), and see 
dialogue as an intrinsic part of the human experience (pg. 28).  Its etymological roots, 
according to Kazepides, speak about “all things related to human development and 
experience” (Kazepides, 2004: 170). 
 
It is speculated that the genesis of the dialogic form came from pre-literate European 
and African societies (Isaacs, 1999: 24; Senge, 2006: 222; Ellinor and Gerard, 1997: 
29-30), although, in the case of African indigenous societies, its historical development 
was severely disturbed by the onslaught of colonialism and other influences.  
Anthropologist Maria Gimbutas traces European societies as far back as 7000 B.C., 
whom she characterises as “partnership-based cultures” whose use of dialogical 
communication has been postulated on the basis that their cultural identity was not 
predicated on the use of force to secure compliance, but rather on the idea of “the 
equality of all [human forms of] life” and the “sacredness that resides in all forms” 
(Gimbutas quoted in Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 30; addition mine).  In contrast it is 
thought that “dominator-based” cultures, whose emergence from Aryan influences was 
seen to be in evidence much later than those documented in Gimbutas, introduced 
“ways of conversing that were probably more confrontational and closer to the 
discussion-oriented form that still predominates today” (Eisler quoted in Ellinor and 
Gerard, 1998: 31).  
 
In ancient Greece, with the introduction of “a novel cultural constellation, namely 
democracy” (De Maré quoted in Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 31), which guaranteed the 
right of every citizen “to attend the assembly, where two to three thousand people at a 
time would come to vote and listen” (Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 31), the existence of 
dialogical communication is assumed to have been present.  Socrates (469-300 B.C.), 
the early Greek philosopher who lived through these times, is credited with being the 
first to introduce the notion of dialogue through his now famous “question and answer” 
methodology (Plato: The Apology of Socrates, 1914: 4, 11).  However, it is his pupil 
Plato who perfected it into dialogues of “search” and “exposition” (pg. 5).  Plato is 
credited to be “the first thinker to draw out the dialogical nature of the mind” 
(Kazepides, 2004: 170), in which “thinking and discourse are the same thing; except 
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that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind itself 
without a spoken sound” (pg. 170). 
 
Ongoing developments of critique and ‘critical thinking’, which gained prominence in 
the fields of philosophy and literature, began to champion the use of dialogue as a 
means of conversation which gave rise to “critical debates in aesthetic” (Leonardo, 
2004: 11).  With the emergence of the Frankfurt School of thought in Germany, critical 
theory evolved into “a Kantian theory of knowledge coupled with a Freudo-Marxist 
theory of modern society” (pg. 11).  It has been suggested that “theory first became 
critical with the arrival of Kantian critiques of reason, ethics, and beauty” (pg. 11), and 
the Frankfurt School, under the leadership of Max Horkheimer, “sought to make critical 
theory ‘critical’ insofar as it exposed the dialectical tensions in modernity, such as 
between authoritarianism and enlightenment” (pg. 11).  Later, a ‘politically edgy’ form of 
critique, made critical by its use of “agitational theory”, was seen to emerge. (Agger, 
1992, quoted in Leonardo, 2004: 11).  This form of ‘critical thinking’, which advocated 
the use of dialogue in the context of ‘argumentation’ and ‘debate’, was concerned with 
the critique of “institutional and conceptual transformations” (pg. 11). 
 
Subsequently, developments in educational theory such as pragmatism, an 
educational and philosophical discourse advocated by Dewey (1994), Freire’s theory of 
adult education which is set “within a larger framework of radical social change” 
(Merriam and Cafarella, 1911: 262) and encompasses significant contributions to 
“ideology critique, an analysis of culture, attention to discourse, and a recasting of the 
teacher as an intellectual and cultural worker” (Leonardo, 2004: 12-13), and Mezirow’s 
notion of perspective transformation which involves communicative learning (Mezirow, 
1990: 65), began to strengthen the view of critical social theory as a “multidisciplinary 
framework with the implicit goal of advancing the emancipatory function of knowledge” 
(Leonardo, 2004: 11), through dialogue. 
 
Within this framework, dialogue came to be viewed as a core function of the learning 
process and there are several features or disciplines which differentiate it as “a critical 
form of classroom discourse; one whose contribution promotes criticism as the defining 
aspects of a quality education” (Leonardo, 2004: 11).  Firstly, the bringing together of a 
diverse group of individuals brings with it a “convergence of existing disciplines” (pg. 
0608395V - Masters Thesis – J Marais 15
11), allowing for a collective pooling of a wide range of expertise, knowledge and 
experience.  This in turn creates the “context for a critical approach” (pg. 11) and the 
“promotion of critical thinking through in-depth analysis” (pg. 11) by “critique in material 
and discursive forms” (pg. 11; emphasis mine).  When groups of individuals are 
brought together to discuss a common topic of interest, each brings aspects of their 
own understanding and perspectives to the occasion, which results in the creation of a 
conducive milieu for healthy interaction in the form of deeper analysis, assessment, 
evaluation, review and appraisal.  The result is that the group, by virtue of their 
intercourse with one another, are thereby able to broaden their own horizons of 
possibility, expand their sense of what it means to belong to a larger humanity and 
escape from the confines of common sense (pg. 11), in order to open themselves up to 
alternative ways of perceiving and understanding reality. 
 
2.2.2 Dialogue Is Language:  
 
Burbules, who studied dialogue in educational settings, sees dialogue as a “language 
of listening, where participants are willing to hear each other’s contributions” (Burbules 
quoted in Roman, 2005: 19).  He argues that “dialogue is a fundamental issue, not only 
for education per se, but for a range of broader human concerns” (Burbules quoted in 
Roman, 2005: 61), citing human practices, such as language, reasoning, morality, and 
social organisation, as a direct result of the way in which we communicate (pg. 61).  
 
A more sophisticated theory of dialogue as language was developed by Bakhtin.  He 
believed that “discourses, as social viewpoints, or ‘voices’, circulate across time and 
space, some of which become internalised in the individual’s consciousness” 
(Hamston, 2006: 57).  According to Bakhtin, “the multiplicity of social voices – 
heteroglossia – arises because different discourses are available for an individual to 
appropriate, to internalise, and to speak through and, thus, permeate the language 
exchanged between individuals when they engage in dialogue” (Bakhtin quoted in 
Hamston, 2006: 57).  Within this framework discursive tensions arise because of the 
various social voices which surface during the dialogic process (pg. 57), creating 
opportunity for changes in consciousness and perspectives which in turn lead to a 
change in discourse.  Bakhtin believed that this was made possible “because dialogue 
is a process of building and consciousness-raising that increases individual’s 
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awareness of the varied discourses available in society and, ultimately through self-
reflection, the discourses she chooses to speak through” (Bakhtin, quoted in Hamston, 
2006: 57). 
  
“To Bakhtin, such a conceptualisation of dialogue acknowledges the 
mutuality of the individual and society; the language an individual 
speaks, and larger social discourses; and the ongoing dialogical 
process and discourse-change.  Language as dialogue therefore 
encourages an ethical agency which foregrounds the linguistic basis 
of ‘becoming’ and of discursive change” (Hamston, 2006: 58). 
 
I understand this to mean that dialogue is informed by the choice of language through 
which participants consciously ‘choose’ to communicate; a choice which is, in turn, 
governed by several dynamics based upon historical, social, political contexts, 
amongst others. 
 
2.2.3 Dialogue Is Relationship: 
 
Martin Buber viewed dialogue as evidence of ‘beings-in-relationship’.  “The importance 
of the spoken word, I think, is grounded in the fact that it does not want to remain with 
the speaker.  It reaches out toward a hearer, it lays hold of him, it even makes the 
hearer into a speaker, if perhaps only a soundless one … the word that is spoken is 
found … in the oscillating sphere between the persons, the sphere that I call the 
‘between’” (Buber, 1961: 354).  “In the dialogue of which Buber writes, all living is a 
meeting.  There is no “I” which stands alone, but only the “I” of “I-It” and the “I” of “I-
Thou”.  There is an alternation between those two modes of existence.  The I-It mode 
is vitally necessary for living, the I-Thou for the realisation of personhood” (Jacobs, 
1989: 1).  Roman interprets Buber to mean that “we can create two kinds of relations to 
others: either we can turn genuinely towards the other and see him or her as an equal 
being, or we can treat the other as an object or thing” (Roman, 2005: 60), and draws 
connections to Buber’s world of primary words: the I-It denoting the other person as an 
object, while the I-Thou is seen in terms of a direct and mutual relation. 
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I interpret this to mean that dialogue occurs between two or more people who are 
bound by their humanness as equals in a genuine encounter with each other.  I think 
that this is what Paulo Freire meant when he wrote that “if it is in speaking their word 
that people, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way by 
which they achieve significance as human beings” (Freire, 1970: 69).  Freire, writing 
through the lens of one who understands what it means to experience being reduced to 
the level of a ‘thing’ in an imposed I-It purview of reality, believed that by “founding 
itself upon love, humility, and faith, dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which 
mutual trust between the dialoguers is the logical consequence” (Freire, 1970: 72). 
 
Bakhtin (1981), who, as we have seen, believed that language is fundamentally 
dialogue, also believed in the dialogical ‘encounter’ as one of ‘relationship’, from the 
point of view that, when speaking to one another, the interaction thus created through 
the ensuing conversation served to create a web of connection between the speakers 
(Bakhtin, quoted in Roman, 2005: 61).  This relationship, which lay in the things people 
had actually said, and thus included prior conversations, was dialogical in nature: 
“through language we are joined to previous as well as present speakers” (Bakhtin 
quoted in Roman, 2005: 61).  In this way Bakhtin draws attention to the view that 
dialogue exists within a relational framework between the past and the present as well 
as that which is immediately evident amongst the dialoguers themselves. 
 
2.2.4 Dialogue Is Communally Constructed: 
 
Isaacs describes dialogue as “a shared inquiry, a way of thinking and reflecting 
together” (Isaacs, 1991: 9).  He also describes it in terms of “a living experience of 
inquiry within and between people” (pg. 9), and as “a conversation among peers” (pg. 
322).  Isaacs speaks of dialogue as “an altogether very different way of talking 
together” (pg. 19), and not simply as better conversation.  For Isaacs, dialogue 
represents a “conversation with a centre, not sides” (pg. 19) and explains: “It is a way 
of taking the energy of our differences and channelling it toward something that has 
never been created before.  It lifts us out of polarisation and into a greater common 
sense, and is thereby a means for accessing the intelligence and coordinated power of 
groups of people” (Isaacs, 1991: 19). 
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In dialogue “participants find that they are involved in an ever changing and developing 
pool of common meaning … a shared consciousness emerges which allows a level of 
creativity and insight that is not generally available to individuals” (Bohm et al, 1991: 5).  
Bohm et al see dialogue as having an evolving methodology in which the essence of 
the dialogical encounter is seen as that of exploration and learning as opposed to the 
process of “consuming a body of information or doctrine imparted by an authority, [or] 
as a means of examining or criticising a particular theory or programme” (Bohm et al, 
1991: 2).  In this context dialogue was regarded as an unfolding process of creative 
participation between peers (pg. 2). 
 
In a similar vein, Schein sees dialogue as a technique or mechanism that makes it 
possible for people to discover that they use language differently, that they operate 
from different mental models, and that the categories they employ are ultimately 
learned social constructions of reality and thus arbitrary (Schein, 1993: 29).  Schein 
advocates that an important goal of dialogue is to enable the group to reach a higher 
level of consciousness and creativity through the gradual creation of a shared set of 
meanings and a common” thinking process (pg. 30).  “In dialogue … we explore all the 
complexities of thinking and language.  We discover how arbitrary our basic categories 
of thought and perception are and thereby become conscious of imperfections or 
biases in our basic cognitive processes” (Schein, 1993: 30). 
 
Within these contexts I am left with the sense that dialogue can be viewed as an 
‘exploratory’ think-tank in which participants share their collective knowledge and 
experiences, examine them in the light of what others have to say and contribute, and 
thereafter collectively participate toward obtaining a shared perspective which 
ultimately leads to a collective constitution of meaning.  Meaning is derived at 
consensually through “reflective inquiry” (Isaacs, 1999: 194), which has developed its 
understanding from what Argyris calls “balancing advocacy and inquiry” (Argyris 
quoted in Isaacs, 1999: 188).  According to this frame of reference, advocacy is taken 
to mean “speaking what you think, speaking for a point of view” (Isaacs, 1999: 188), 
whereas inquiry “means looking into what you do not yet know, what you do not yet 
understand, or seeking to discover what others see and understand that may differ 
from your point of view” (pg. 188).  At its core, bringing advocacy and inquiry together 
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implies “learning how to make explicit the thinking that leads you to say what you say” 
(pg. 189). 
 
In Mezirow’s transformation theory, which includes perspective transformation, 
consensual validation is used as a means of validity testing in which “the focus of 
communication is not establishing cause-effect relationships but increasing insight and 
attaining common ground through symbolic interaction” (Mezirow, 1991: 80).  
Influenced by the work of Jürgen Habermas, a German social theorist, whose ideas on 
rationality in dialogue were to anchor Mezirow’s understanding of “communicative 
learning”, Mezirow asserts that “dialogue or communicative action (spoken or written 
communication) occurs whenever an individual with particular aims communicates with 
another person in order to arrive at an understanding about the meaning of a common 
experience so that they may coordinate their actions in pursuing their respective aims” 
(pg. 65).  In Mezirow’s terms, the purpose of communication is that of reaching 
consensus or understanding, and he proposed that “dialogue or communicative action 
allows us to relate to the world around us, to other people, and to our own intentions, 
feelings, and desires (pg. 65).  ”Dialogue in any of these areas involves either implicit 
or explicit claims regarding the justification or validity of what is said, implied, or 
presupposed.  The meaning of an utterance is inherently connected with the validity 
claims it makes” (pg. 66). 
 
Habermas is credited with having provided “the sociolinguistic theoretical context for 
transformational theory” (Mezirow, 1991: 64), at the heart of which lies the use of 
metaphorical-abductive logic (as opposed to hypothetical-deductive logic), and the 
application of rationality, which is to make sense of meaning by a process of reflection 
(pgs 84-5; 99).  Metaphorical-abductive logic is distinct from hypothetical-deductive 
logic in that it moves from the concrete to the abstract rather than from the abstract to 
the concrete.  “In communication, we try to understand what someone else means 
‘abductively’, that it, by drawing upon our experience to explain theirs” (Hanson quoted 
in Mezirow, 1991: 85).  In this sense abduction draws on what might be, deduction on 
what must be, and induction on what actually is. Together they form the self-directed 
elements that constitute the dialogical process where reflection is seen as “the central 
dynamic in intentional learning, problem solving, and validity testing through rational 
discourse” (Mezirow, 1991: 99).   
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For Habermas, there are three types of reflection involving differing levels of cognition, 
which he labels “habitual action” (Habermas, quoted in Mezirow, 1991: 106), 
“thoughtful action” (pg. 106) and “reflective action” (pg. 108).  The latter involves an 
element of thoughtful action when directed at an assessment of content, process or 
premise of our action, and occurs only when we require guidance in negotiating a step 
in a series of actions or run into difficulty in understanding a new experience.  In 
habitual action, such as learning to drive a motor vehicle, we are free to act while 
focusing our attention elsewhere and therefore involves a non-reflective response (pg. 
106).  In thoughtful action, we involve higher-order cognitive processes to guide us as 
we analyse, perform, discuss or make judgements drawn from prior learning, or from 
using our beliefs to make an interpretation, or by introspection (pg. 107).  The ground 
for our justification is not brought about through a deliberate appraisal or re-appraisal, 
or by a process of validity testing, but rather through cognition – which is not the same 
as reflection (pg. 107).  An example of this would be deciding on the next appropriate 
move when confronted with an enforced detour along an otherwise familiar road.  
Thoughtful action only becomes reflective action when we examine how we perform in 
relation to our perceiving, thinking, feeling or acting and undertake an assessment of 
our efficacy in performing them (pg. 107), or when we begin to question whether ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ are adequate values or concepts for judging and involves our becoming aware 
of why we perceive, think, feel or act (pg. 108).  An example would be found in the 
decision taken to purchase a particular vehicle in relation to others, requiring that we 
examine the motivation for our choice against criteria such as aesthetics, performance, 
functionality, pricing, and affordability.  
 
In dialogue participants engage each other in the solicitation of critique in material and 
discursive forms whilst using the processes of reflection (rationale) and metaphorical-
abductive logic to make sense of their understanding of reality.  In order to do so, 
according to Habermas, they bring into play “three interrelated dynamics … involved in 
communicative action” (Mezirow, 1991: 69), which are “the life world, learning, and 
social interaction” (pg. 69).  The life world is a representation of our daily social activity, 
which we tend to take for granted, comprising of all our “unquestioned assumptions 
and shared cultural convictions, including codes, norms, roles, social practices, 
psychological patterns of dealing with others, … [and] individual skills” (pg. 69, addition 
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mine).  The facilitation of our communication through language “provides learners with 
a basis from which to begin negotiating common definitions and situations” (pg. 69) 
and offers a level of interaction, which in turn ties participants into “the transformative 
nature of the learning process” (pg. 70), which is defined and bounded by the “self-
regulating system of society and social interaction” (pg. 71). 
 
Mezirow (1991) emphasises the importance of critical thinking and the determination of 
meaning within the dialogical process.  Consensus is reached through the concept of 
what Habermas calls “argumentation”, which refers to “that process of dialogue in 
which implicit validity claims are made explicit and contested, with an effort to criticise 
and vindicate them through arguments” (pg. 68).  The goal of the dialogic encounter, 
as I understand it, therefore, is to provide an opportunity for participants to examine 
their own perceptions in light of those being presented by others and to engage in 
arguments containing reasons or grounds that are relevant to supporting a validity 
claim using reflection, which is the application of rationality to validity testing.  Within 
this framework metaphorical-abductive logic becomes salient in communication as 
participants try to understand what someone else means while drawing from their own 
experience to do so. 
 
Boghossian (quoted in Zimmerman, 2007: 160 pp) emphasises the need to balance 
this level of inquiry, articulated by Mezirow as having “its current context in the 
insurgence of constructivism, critical theory and deconstructivism” (Mezirow, 1991: xiii), 
with “objective criteria” (Boghossian quoted in Zimmerman, 2007: 161).  Boghossian 
argues that ‘epistemic relativism’, a term he uses to describe the construction of 
knowledge in groups where knowledge itself is perceived “from the metaphysical view 
that knowledge is a ‘social construction’” (pg. 161), fails to take into account that: “(1) 
At least some of the facts we know are not constituted by human minds and activities. 
(The fact that dinosaurs once roamed the earth as an example.) (2) The relation of 
support that holds between a body of evidence and some hypothesis that this evidence 
gives us to reason to endorse does not depend upon us for its existence. (3) We are 
capable of believing some things because we appreciate the evidence in their support 
and not for ulterior motives” (pg. 161).  Boghossian also argues that there can be no 
such thing as ‘equal validity’ that is based upon the idea “that there are many radically 
different yet “equally valid” ways of knowing the world” (pg. 160).  He illustrates his 
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argument by pointing to the fact that while the Cheyenne River Sioux might believe that 
humans descended from ‘buffalo people’, the scientific community may also be right in 
asserting that humans evolved, instead, from non-human primates: both explanations 
cannot be true.  If validity “is supposed to involve truth, these explanations can’t both 
be valid and they can’t both constitute items of knowledge” (pg. 160).  
 
2.2.5 Dialogue Is Fellowship: 
 
In the 1970s, the psychologist Patrick de Maré began to research dialogue in large 
settings, and its effect on culture (Roman, 2005: 39).  De Maré “suggested that large 
group socio-therapy meetings could enable people to engage in understanding and 
altering the cultural meanings present within society to heal the sources of mass 
conflict, violence and ethnic bigotry (Isaacs quoted in Roman, 2005: 39).  As related by 
Nichol in his foreword to Bohm’s book On Dialogue, “the theory of the “microculture” 
proposes that a sampling of an entire culture can exist in a group of twenty or more 
people, thereby charging it with multiple views and value systems” (Nichol quoted in 
Bohm, 1996: xix; see also Matos, 2006: 5).  “De Maré formulated this theory in his work 
with groups of twenty or more people, who sit in a circle to talk, eventually developing a 
sense of impersonal fellowship among them known by the Greeks as Koinonia.  
Impersonal refers to gratitude towards a group of individuals with whom we share no 
family ties or past experiences” (Matos, 2006: 5). 
 
Bohm refers to impersonal fellowship as the emergence of “authentic trust and 
openness … in a group context, without its members having shared extensive history.  
Bohm et al (1991) extrapolate the idea further in the context of hunter-gatherer bands 
of about this size who “seemed to provide and reinforce a kind of cohesive bond of 
fellowship that allowed its participants to know what was required of them without the 
need for instruction or much further verbal interchange” (Bohm et al, 1991: 4).  Seen in 
this way, “what might be called a coherent culture of shared meaning emerged within 
the group” (pg. 4). 
 
De Maré’s study led him to explain that the driving force behind both the sustainability 
and transforming power of dialogue is frustration and hate (Roman, 2005: 70).  “De 
Maré says that a larger group, because of its size, generates hate, and he actually 
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sees this as an achievement for the group” (pg. 70).  According to De Maré, “We can 
learn to transform this hate into Koinonia, which is a special kind of atmosphere of 
impersonal fellowship” (De Maré quoted in Roman, 2005: 70).  
 
I agree with Roman (2005), who observes that to make use of the word “hate” as “the 
driving force of dialogue” (Roman, 2005: 73) is too reductionist “because hate alone 
can also lead to violence” (pg 73).  Roman proposes that “dialogue is born from a 
willingness to solve differences in ways other than using violence” (pg 73) and seeks to 
look for an alternative descriptor to describe this ‘frustration’, which De Maré has 
attributed to the dynamics which operate within the group.  
 
2.3 Dialogue Within Society: 
 
In a comparative study of community dialogue processes Wasilewski (2005) reviews 
several dialogical models which she refers to as “an ‘alphabet soup’ of approaches to 
communication” (Wasilewski, 2005: 2).  Whilst her study primarily aims to construct 
approaches to communication as seen in evidence “in-between social worlds” (pg. 2), 
her research findings summarise contemporary structured dialogue processes 
currently found within society today. 
 
In her research paper, Wasilewski focuses on four primary models of dialogue, which 
she calls: the Boundary-spanning Dialogue Approach (BDA), within which the concept 
of Indigeneity emerges; the Transcultural Dialogue Approach (TCD), which is based 
upon the work of David Bohm; the Coordinated Management of Meaning Approach 
(CMM), based on the work of W. Barnett Pearce; and the Powerful Non-Defensive 
Communication Approach (PNDC), which is based upon Sharon Ellison’s model of 
communication. 
 
Wasilewski acknowledges, though she pays it scant attention, the existence of what 
she has loosely labelled “the Western Approach,” which is characterised as an “attempt 
to solve things through words instead of through fighting … the emphasis [being] on 
persuasion and argumentation” (Wasilewski, 2005: 1).  According to Wasilewski, this 
particular practice of dialogue is dominant in the West and particularly widespread (pg. 
1).   
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2.3.1. Boundary-Spanning Dialogue Approach (BDA): 
 
In the Boundary-spanning Dialogue Approach (BDA), participants “discuss the 
question, “What is the nature of the ‘good’ society?” … in the context of the issues 
facing the region at the present time” (Wasilewski, 2005: 3).  According to Wasilewski, 
this is a structured dialogue process that is “used around the world to deal with 
complex issues” (pg. 3), and usually involves indigenous societies that have an 
association or claim within the region under discussion.  It was a model developed over 
two decades of collaboration between the AIO (Americans for Indian Opportunity) in 
the United States, a “national indigenous peoples’ advocacy organisation”, and 
Alexander Christakis (pg. 3).  The process “generated four cores values which cross 
generation, geography and Tribe.  These four core values, the four R’s, are 
Relationship, Responsibility, Reciprocity & Redistribution” (pg. 5).  Expressed 
collectively as a comprehensive construct called “Indigeneity” (pg. 6), it has relevance 
for dialogue in that: the dialogical encounter is seen as a relationship that “exists … in 
this moment of time, engaging in this interaction, in this dialogue” (pg. 7); these 
relationships include “various personal, social, political, cultural, physical and spiritual 
contexts” (pg. 7), which are invoked by dialoguers during the dialogical process as a 
contemporaneous “state of valuing” (pg. 7) and “sense of caring interconnectedness” 
which is felt by participants.  “Thus this dynamic valuing of the other is inseparable 
from true dialogue” (pg. 8) and involves ‘listening’ and ‘learning’ and “caring enough for 
each other to engage in true dialogue to enable ourselves to be ourselves together” 
(pg. 8).  Against this background the self can be seen only in the context of community 
and so there are, in effect, no personal or ‘private’ truths, only collective ones (pg. 8). 
 
2.3.2 Transcultural Communication Dialogue (TCD) Approach: 
 
The Transcultural Communication Dialogue (TCD) Approach, acknowledged as a 
dialogic practice that grows out of the work of De Maré (1970s), Bohm, Factor and 
Garrett (1996), it is seen as “an almost completely unstructured form of dialogue for 
groups of 20-40 people through which the processes of thought can be slowed down in 
order to be able to observe it collectively while it is actually occurring” (pg. 10).  It is 
held that “such observation reveals the patterns of incoherence that lead a group to 
0608395V - Masters Thesis – J Marais 25
avoid certain issues or, on the other hand, to insist, against all reason, on standing and 
defending opinions about particular issues (Bohm et al quoted in Wasilewski, 2005: 
10).  This approach to dialogue “is based on the collective communication practices of 
hunter-gatherers and reveals an aspect of dialogue called Koinonia, or impersonal 
fellowship, which was used originally to describe the early form of Athenian democracy 
in which all the free men of the city gathered to govern themselves” (pg. 10). 
 
2.3.3 Coordinated Management Of Meaning (CMM) Approach: 
 
The Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) Approach, which bases its 
methodology on the work of Mezirow’s (2000) transformational learning, has given rise 
to three models and five concepts that “enhance our understanding of the dynamics of 
social spaces” in which learning cam take place (Wasilewski, 2005: 11).  The 
Serpentine Model looks at communication as something “we are making together” (pg. 
11).  “According to this model a conversation consists of a linear dimension, a 
sequence of turns, and of a hierarchical dimension of meanings held by each 
participant in the conversation.  The meaning categories consist of different kinds of 
‘stories’ having to do with culture, relationship, self and episode.  These kinds of stories 
are prioritised differently by different people at different times in different contexts.  This 
analytical tool enables us to see if there are any commonly held stories in a 
conversation, and we can see all the stories in the conversation simultaneously and 
how each participant’s stories interact and coevolved with all the others.  In short, we 
can see what we are making together” (pg. 11).    The Daisy Model “helps us analyse 
all the conversations that are taking place simultaneously in any discrete conversation” 
(pg. 12).  “When we talk, we are not always talking only to the person or persons in 
front of us, but to others not present.  This model enables us to identify who the real 
audience of a statement might have been” (pg. 12).  The LUUUTT Model  “helps us 
analyse stories Lived, Untold stories, Unheard stories, Unknown stories, stories Told 
and storyTelling within any communication” (pg. 12).  “This allows facilitators to look at 
a communication event and think how to enrich the mode of storytelling so that more 
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2.3.4  The Powerful, Non-Defensive Communication Approach (PNDC): 
 
The Powerful, Non-Defensive Communication Approach (PNDC), “focuses on the 
ability to make non-defensive statements, to ask non-defensive questions and to make 
non-defensive predictions” (pg. 13).  “It enables a person to give up trying to control 
other people, to leave everyone, including themselves, with choice, to get out of the 
victim mentality and to be responsible for themselves.  Particular attention is paid to 
intention, tone, and body language, that is, totally authentic communicative behaviour” 
(pg. 13). 
 
2.4 Social Dialogue In South Africa:  
 
I am unaware of any official, definitive, or structured dialogue processes currently in 
evidence within the South African context.  This is due, partly, as highlighted by 
Parsons (2005), to the fact that whilst “the social dialogue process has been part of the 
South African public life for several years, … its role has not been adequately noted or 
evaluated” (Parsons, 2005: 1). 
 
Parsons argues that its development has been characterised by what he calls 
“institutionalised social dialogue” (pg. 1), which is tripartite in character – by virtue of its 
convergence of social, economic and political contributions – and driven by the larger 
agenda of “social capital” – which he defines as “the ability of people to work together 
in their enlightened self-interest for common purposes in groups and organisations” 
(pg. 3).  According to Parsons, social capital “identified the conditions in which 
individuals can use their participation in groups and networks to obtain benefits” (pg. 
3).  The need to work together in groups was borne out of the collapse of apartheid.  
“The system of apartheid, by fracturing South African society horizontally and vertically, 
reduced its investment in social capital substantially.  It left a widespread legacy of 
mistrust and suspicion.  The sense of ‘give-and-take’, of compromise, of consensus-
seeking, all these needed to be rediscovered in the post-apartheid era.  It was 
necessary to create institutions and structures which could rebuild trust in a deeply 
divided society” (pg. 4). 
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According to Mgijima (2003), “The struggle against apartheid that trade unions were 
centrally part of was a struggle for ordinary people to take part in shaping the future of 
South Africa.  Right up to the beginning of the 1990s, struggles taken up by trade 
unions ranged from campaigns for new worker friendly labour laws, strategies to deal 
with high unemployment and questions relating to social and economic policy choices 
for the whole of South African society” (Mgijima, 2003: 3).  The result was that: “In 
South Africa there is social dialogue at different levels of the social and economic 
sphere.  There are statutory and non-statutory forms of social dialogue at the 
workplace or local level, departmental or sectoral level, and at national level.  The 
parties involved include labour unions, employers, government and communities” (pg. 
3).  
 
Through several initiatives, driven mainly by business and labour, and the formation of 
the National Economic Forum (NEF), leading to what eventually became known as 
Nedlac (National Economic Development and Labour Council), was formed (Mgijima, 
2003: 3), and “the power relations within the South African economy started to shift 
from a highly paternalistic framework – which essentially had government deciding 
what was best for the country, and employers deciding what was best for their workers 
– towards a more inclusive and consensual framework of decision-making” (Parsons, 
2005: 5).  As the devolution of power began to be negotiated and reconstituted, 
individuals became “equipped … with the necessary tools to act as facilitators, 
mediators and negotiators, and in doing so made a more collaborative decision-making 
process possible” (pg. 5).  The presence of labour unions, which had begun to assume 
increasing political roles, “which extended far beyond the general framework of an 
inclusive collective bargaining unit” (pg. 5), led to severe tensions between all parties 
and organised business, and when the “rising use of strikes and boycotts by the 
unions” (pg. 5) began to hurt the economy, a move away from “a dominant culture of 
‘adversarialism’ in the socio-economic arena towards one of consultation and dialogue” 
began to emerge (pg. 5). 
 
There have been ongoing developments with regard to dialogue (see Parsons, 2005, 
for its full treatment), some successful and some less so, for various reasons.  
However, the formation of Nedlac and the ensuing dialogue that it caused to develop 
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“proved to be a distinctly important institutional bridge between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
regimes and in the building of social capital in South Africa” (Parsons, 2005: 9). 
 
2.5 Social Dialogue Within An African Context Taken From South Africa: 
 
Mekoa (2004) provides a useful insight into what he describes as ‘the African way’ of 
doing things.  He talks of the fact that “in traditional African meetings (imbizos) which 
are usually held under trees in rural areas, African men will always cite many examples 
from their previous experiences in order to justify their suggested solution to the issue 
before them.  It is very common in such meetings to hear old men (in African thought 
seniority is always associated with wisdom, not formal education) citing other 
experiences and examples before offering a direct solution to the issues before them.  
This is because African traditional meetings are not usually rushed and interrupted by 
points of order, or time up, or calls for votes.  Decisions are also reached by consensus 
after long discussion and this approach is also intended to accommodate as many 
diverse views as possible” (Mekoa, 2004: 1). 
 
Mekoa’s account is the only description of an African traditional meeting or dialogue, 
and whilst it is extremely sketchy there are some valuable insights to be gained from a 
closer study of the narrative used.  It is important to notice, for example, the absence of 
women, and the subtle wordplay between older and younger men; the steps that are 
incorporated in the dialogical process, ranging from the citation of stories or examples 
by both older and younger men, through to points of decision and judgement involving 
some form or other of consensus.  For example, the fact that consensus is reached 
after participants share their personal experiences, and thereby provide some or other 
ground by which they justify their choice of a proposed solution to the problem before 
them, indicates that a certain degree of advocacy must be involved.  Coupled with 
advocacy are assumed behaviours such as ‘discussion’ or possibly even ‘debate’ as 
speakers attempt to win over others with their argument.  There are indications that 
these meetings are not without a purpose or, at the very least, an agenda, and that 
they are possibly structured around a problem-posing strategy, which suggests a form 
of reflection.  If we attempt to follow this line of reasoning it is possible to reconstruct a 
basic idea or outline of what the practice of dialogue would look like in a typical African 
meeting or imbizo. 




Turning again to the inference that traditional African dialogue is a strictly male affair 
(pg. 1), and that the meetings are devoid of the presence of women or children; or, if 
they are present at such gatherings, that they are not invited to participate in the 
proceedings, this leads us to questions relating to power and gender relations, and to 
whether or not there is any substance in the contention that both women and children 
are without voice.  In REFLECT circles (REFLECT is an acronym for Regenerated 
Freirean Literacy through Empowering Community Techniques) in Lesotho, for 
example, it was found that “women do not commonly participate in the traditional public 
decision-making meetings, although they make most of the day to day decisions in the 
household” (Attwood et al in Robinson Pant, 2004: 144).  In contrasting studies of 
REFLECT circles in Uganda, which sought to elicit an understanding of gender 
oriented differences between men and women based upon a separation of their 
respective workloads, participants found it difficult to identify or position themselves 
within the debate conjured up through the “stereotypes about gender that the tool was 
attempting to criticise” (Fiedrich in Robinson Pant, 2004: 223), i.e. that “women tend to 
be subordinate to men, and to have a heavier workload” (Archer and Cottingham 
quoted by Fiedrich in Robinson Pant, 2004: 222), suggesting that the REFLECT 
gender-workload-calendar, which was being used as the tool through which to 
stimulate the discussion, was not “an authentic representation of participants’ realities 
as perceived by them” (Fiedrich in Robinson Pant, 2004: 223).  These differing 
perspectives highlight the need to further examine the role of women within African 




Mekoa’s use of storytelling as the primary means of communication amongst those 
who have assembled begs the question as to whether these encounters do in fact 
resemble a dialogue-session, or whether they are more likely to conform to a 
monologue-session, where participants talk ‘at’ each other rather than through ‘turning 
to one another’ which implies an interactive dynamic.  Fasokun et al state that “in 
essence, the story is a primary form of oral tradition used in conveying culture, 
0608395V - Masters Thesis – J Marais 30
experience, values, knowledge and wisdom” (Fasokun et al, 2005: 16).  In this sense 
they are said to inform, instruct and support the basic tenets of African culture (pg. 16).  
Fasokun at al also note that “only those people who are regarded as adults by the 
community can make use of stories and … an adult’s repertoire is also likely to include 
myths and legends … a rich mixture of history and traditional beliefs – tales of gods, 
ghosts, spirits, famous ancestors, heroes and powerful kingdoms of the past” (pg. 16-
17).  The invocation of the sacred aligns with Ntuli’s notion of linking “with the 
supernatural forces that guide our destinies” (Ntuli, 2002: 58). Fasokun conveys the 
sense that participants’ engagement is linked to an understanding of their community 
status and the tacit ground from which it is derived.  The status of “men” versus “older 
men” for instance, in Mekoa’s account (pg. 1), gives rise to a dynamic that suggests 
older men have a certain community status or positional authority over younger men, 
which may or may not affect the outcome of a perceived consensus.  It is interesting 
that, according to Mekoa (pg. 1), younger men “justify their suggested solution” 
implying some form of advocacy, whereas older men offer “a direct solution”, implying 
that it is considered unnecessary that they should advocate a rationale for their 
preferred choice of action.  Fasokun et al state that older people “are believed to be 
wiser and are able to call on experience to guide their intellectual decision-making” 
(Fasokun et al, 2005: 72) and that this accords them with “a major role in the governing 
of the community” (pg. 76).  A case study is needed to examine these connections with 
a view to clarifying their importance for an understanding of a typical African imbizo or 




Mekoa (2004) makes reference to the fact that a “long discussion” of the “experiences 
and examples” constitutes the order of proceedings in a traditional African meeting, in 
which there is no rush, no interruption, no points of order, no time restraints, and no 
votes taken (pg. 1).    Native American indigenous cultures, for example, are said to 
“talk and talk until the talk starts” (Isaacs, 1999: xvii).  In wanting to establish a sense of 
the essential components of how Mekoa’s notion of a ‘discussion’ takes place, I begin 
by looking at the etymological derivative of the word.  The word ‘discussion’ is derived 
from the same root as “percussion” and “concussion” which supports the meaning of 
“to break things up” (Bohm, 1990: 7), or “to shake apart” (Isaacs, 1999: 42).  The 
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picture that this evokes appears to conflict with an African world-view as enunciated by 
both Ntuli (2002) and Ramose (quoted in Horsthemke and Enslin, 2006).  If an African 
understanding of reality involves the acceptance of shifting realities and the notion of 
“interrelationship and interconnectedness” (Ntuli, 2002: 58), duality (pg. 55), and a 
“holistic vision” (pg. 60), then what, if anything, is to be gained by a practice of 
examination which requires an attempt to arrive at meaning by an examination of the 
whole through the lens of its constitutive parts?  Sithole (2004) provides an alternative 
insight, albeit an African one, and suggests that there are two types of rationality: 
cause-and-effect reasoning which emanates from so-called Western knowledge and 
requires the condition of objectivity, and consciousness-reasoning or persona-centred 
reasoning, as preferred by Sithole, which emanates from our “various social values”  
(pg. 2).  Persona-centred reasoning is predicated on a renewal of our understanding of 
rationality, which is said to be “the power ‘to reason’, ‘to disaggregate and reconstitute’, 
according to ‘certain principles’ of association and disassociation” (pg. 3).  If the ability 
to reason is seen as an act of attributing judgement or value, merit or worth, then, 
according to Sithole, “To reason can therefore not stand alone: it is completed by the 
values that make a judgement on why action is or should be taken.  If rationality is a 
distinctly human attribute, then judgement or morality that comes with reason is a 
distinctly human obligation” (pg. 3).  In this sense, Sithole argues, that it would seem 
“that judgement, value, or to be categoric about it, morality, is a requirement of 
rationality which is characteristic of being human.  This merger between the power to 
reason and morality is called ubuntu.  Ubuntu is recognition of the fact that reason and 
morality cannot exist without one another” (pg. 3).  If, by ‘discussion’, Mekoa has 
Sithole’s view of ‘persona-centred’ reasoning in mind, then the notion of advocacy and 
judgement as perceived by Ramose’s rheomodic thought, where reality and truth are 
seen in the context of a relationship between the observer and the observed, would 
once more hold currency.  This brings into question the issues pertaining to subjectivity 
and the relativism about truth (cf. Horsthemke, 2004: 74-5 for an in-depth discussion 
and analysis), which are problematic.  Sithole’s suggestion that rationality is also 
associated with the principle of ubuntu raises other important considerations as to 
whether ubuntu can provide a model for rational discourse and action based on the fact 
that “some of the values and principles claimed to be emphasised by ubuntu are 
dubious” (Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004: 548), and “appears to be contradicted or at 
least weakened by the staggering incidence of genocide, dictatorships and autocratic 
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rule, corruption, sexism (and practices of clitoridectomy), heterosexism and 
homophobia and, indeed, environmental degradation (and connected with this, human 
suffering) on the African continent. … Moreover, defenders of ubuntu would find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to resolve possible conflicts between values or principles 
broadly associated with ubuntu; between liberty and humanness or between spirituality 
and morality” (pgs. 548-9).  It would suggest a serious dichotomy between what Chris 
Argyris and Donald Schön (1974) refer to as “the problems of relating theory to 
practice” (pg. 3) or those of “integration of thought and action” (pg. 4).  
 
2.5.4 Advocacy, Consensus And Judgement: 
 
Some of the components required for the justification or support of a particular view 
have already received attention; such as the dynamic between older and younger men, 
the role of the supernatural, issues of relativism and the subjective nature of what is 
perceived as truth, through to an examination of a rationale based upon 
consciousness-reasoning that is grounded in the principles of ubuntu.  Each has 
received its own share of criticism and in the absence of concrete examples of their 
application in practice, it is difficult to gauge just how advocacy would be ‘argued’ and 
consensus reached to ensue in a judgement (value or worth) in terms of a course of 
action for the “issue” at hand.  For instance, the belief that a majority-view constitutes 
the truth is not obviously correct, and the claims of consciousness-reasoning 
advocated by Sithole (2004) require some form of demonstrable “proof” as their 




It is worth noting that ‘imbizos’ or ‘meetings’ are value-bound in the sense that (1) they 
have an agenda, (2) and they have a purpose; which is to make a concrete decision 
about a matter that is of concern to the group.  What remains in contention is just how 
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2.6 Dialogue Within Organisations 
 
Argyris and Schön have explored “the gaps between what people intend to do and 
what they actually do” (Isaacs, 1999: 187).  In an article delving into organisational 
dynamics Argyris explains that “people acquire through socialisation two kinds of skills 
and values for dealing with people“ (Argyris, 1982: 8).  “The first are the values and 
skills that they espouse, the ones of which they are conscious and aware. I call these 
espoused theories of action.  Often when people are dealing with difficult and 
threatening problems, their behaviour is inconsistent with their espoused theories. ‘Do 
as I say, not as I do’ illustrates the point and at the same time proves that the point is 
not new … I call it the theory in use.  We use it without thinking about it.  When we do 
think about it, we see that the results are often at odds with what we espouse” (pg. 8).  
These observations led Argyris and Schön to develop what has now become known as 
single and double loop learning.  Mezirow explains it in the sense that single loop 
learning reflects the values of “achieve the objective as I see it,” “strive to win and 
avoid losing,” “avoid negative feelings” and “be rational (stay cool)” (Mezirow, 1990: 
370).  He points to the fact that this kind of reasoning leads to engagement strategies 
that “include unilateral control of the task environment and of protection of self and 
others” (pg. 370), and argues further that interpersonal relations are viewed as a win-
lose dynamic which is “a closed and defensive orientation” (pg. 370).  In contrast, 
double loop learning is critically reflective and constitutes “learning about the values 
and assumptions that generate one’s own or another’s behaviour” (pg. 370).  Argyris 
shows that single loop learning leads people to engage in “defensive” routines and 
strategies that are designed to “save face”, which ultimately allow them to “create 
misunderstanding, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes and escalating 
error” (Argyris, 1982: 9).  According to this perspective, organisational behaviour 
reduces to encounters that are primarily “competitive win / lose group and intergroup 
dynamics with many protective games that are undiscussable” (pg. 9).  Schein, working 
with Argyris and Schön’s model, recognises that “to be polite, to protect everyone’s 
face, especially our own, we tend to say what we feel is most appropriate and least 
hurtful [where] it becomes a cultural rule to “say something nice if you say anything at 
all, and if you can’t say something nice, don’t say anything” (Schein, 1993: 28; addition 
mine). 
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I find that Argyris and Schön’s “defensive routines” accurately reflect my own 
experiences of interaction within organisational settings and can agree with Schein 
who argues that, for this very reason, problem-solving groups “should begin in a 
dialogue format to facilitate the building of sufficient common ground and mutual trust, 
and make it possible to tell what is really on one’s mind” (Schein, 1993: 29). 
 
Schein (1993) and Isaacs (1999), who were colleagues at MIT and studied the theory 
and practice of dialogue within learning organisations, have arguably become the first 
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In each model the flow of dialogue reaches a ‘fundamental choice point’ in which the 
dialoguer pursues one of two possibilities put before him.  In the case of Isaacs 
defensive routines lead to controlled discussion and debate or skilful conversation and 
dialectic confrontation, while suspending or listening leads to reflective and possibly 
generative dialogue.  Schein’s model is simpler but equally effective.  He sees the 
choice point emerging into a conscious flow of listening (suspending) or discussion, 
which in turn flows into dialogue and metalogue, or dialectical confrontation and debate 
respectively. 
 
Within this framework the salient features which constitute the dynamics of the 




Schein describes how, “as a conversation develops, there comes a point where we 
sense some form of disconfirmation … we perceive that our point was not understood, 
or we elicit disagreement, challenge, or attack” (Schein, 1993: 32).  According to 
Schein, this moment is critical and leads to “a genuine choice between (1) voicing my 
reaction and (2) letting the matter go (thereby suspending my own reaction)” (pg. 33).  
Bohm et al (1991) believe that this suspending of one’s thoughts, impulses, 
judgements, etc., lies at the heart of dialogue (Bohm et al, 1991: 6).  For them, 
“suspension involves exposing your reactions, impulses, feelings and opinions in such 
a way that they can be seen and felt within your own psyche and also be reflected back 
by others in the group” (pg. 6).  Bohm et al, like Schein, see suspension as a way of 
examining and evaluating one’s own perceptions and assumptions, as well as those 
within the group in what Schein portrays as a “process of becoming reflective that 
makes us realise that the first problem of listening to others is to identify the distortions 
and biases that filter own cognitive processes” (Schein, 1993: 33).  Suspension “does 
not mean repressing or suppressing, or even, postponing” (Bohm et al, 1991: 6) one’s 
thoughts and feelings, but rather the act of giving “attention to, say, the strong feelings 
that accompany the expression of a particular thought – either or your own or another’s 
– and to sustain that attention” (pg. 6) so that by doing so it “will permit you to begin to 
see the deeper meanings underlying your thought process and to sense the often 
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incoherent structure of any action that you might otherwise carry out automatically” (pg. 
6).  Schein sees this as “a state of knowing one’s thought as one is having it” (Schein, 
1993: 33), which results in our being able to “get in touch with what is going on in the 
here and now, and become conscious of how much our thought and perception are 
both a function of our past learning and the immediate events that trigger it” (pg. 33).  
Similarly, Isaacs (1999) defines suspension as that state of becoming “aware of the 
processes that generate thought” (Isaacs, 1999: 143), which in turn lead to a deeper 
awareness “that our thoughts do not simply arise from nowhere but have an origin of a 
very particular and deterministic sort” (pg. 144).  Isaacs call this ‘certainty’ and sees 
awareness as the absence of certainty, which allows us to “change direction, to stop, 
step back, see things with new eyes” (pg. 135).  In this context, suspension, for Isaacs, 
can thus also come to mean “to disclose, to make available for yourself and others the 
contents of your consciousness so you may see what is going on” (Isaacs, 1999: 142).  
When this type of suspension is in evidence, it can either lead to reflection and new 
opportunities for seeing things from a different perspective or it can lead to a certainty 




For Isaacs (1999), “the heart of dialogue is a simple but profound capacity to listen” 
(Isaacs, 1999: 83).  “Listening requires we not only hear the words, but also embrace, 
accept, and gradually let go of our own inner clamouring.  As we explore it, we discover 
that listening is an expansive activity.  It gives us a way to perceive more directly the 
ways we participate in the world around us” (pg. 83).  Schein says that “we have to 
listen to ourselves before we can really understand others” (Schein, 1993: 33).  
“Furthermore,” says Schein, “there may be nothing in our cultural learning to support 
such introspection” (pg. 33).  For Bohm et al (1991), listening is a vital component of 
the participative process within the dialogic encounter, where the word participation 
has two meanings: ‘to partake of’, and ‘to take part in’… “listening is at least as 
important as speaking” (Bohm et al, 1991: 6-7). “Our capacity to listen puts us in 
contact with the wider dimensions of the world in which we live … I see listening, 
properly understood and developed, as an immediate gateway that can connect us 
with the much-touted but much-misunderstood notion that we live in a ‘participative 
universe’” (Isaacs, 1999: 87).  By “participative universe”, Isaacs refers to a principle of 
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participation which “builds upon the realisation that individuals are active participants in 
the living world, a part of nature as well as observers of it” (pg. 87).  At its centre is the 
idea that human being participate intimately in their worlds and are not separate from 




Schein (1993) observes that “suspension allows reflection, which is very similar to the 
emphasis, in group dynamics training, on observing the ‘here and now’” (Schein, 1993: 
33).  He goes on, however, to distinguish a notable difference in the exercise of 
reflection by recalling that Isaacs sees ‘reflective attention’ as that of “looking at the 
past” (pg. 33), in contrast with “’proprioception’ – attention to and living in the moment” 
(pg. 33), which is the essence of dialogue as a way of achieving “a state of knowing 
one’s thought as one is having it” (pg. 33).  Says Schein: 
 
“Whether proprioception in this sense is psychologically possible is 
debatable, but the basic idea is to shorten the internal feedback loop 
as much as possible.  As a result, we can get in touch with what is 
going on in the here and now, and become conscious of how our 
thought and perception are both a function of our past learning and 
the immediate events that trigger it.  This learning is difficult at best, 
yet lies at the heart of the ability to enter dialogue” (Schein, 1993: 33). 
 
Isaacs sees the kind of thinking implied here as “something we do while acting” 
(Isaacs, 1999: 141), and links this to the work of Schön who describes it as “the ability 
to see what is happening as it is happening” (Schön quoted in Isaacs, 1999: 141).  
“Reflecting in this way means we are able to free ourselves from habitual ways of 
responding and stay fresh and alive” (Isaacs, 1999: 141). 
 
Isaacs (1999) and Schein (1993) have each been influenced by the work of Bohm, who 
was drawn to the study of dialogue as a particular phenomenon whilst studying 
electrons.  Bohm drew an “analogy between the collective properties of particles and 
the way in which our thought works” (Roman, 2005: 39).  He saw that “this sort of 
analogy could throw an important light on the general counter-productiveness of 
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thought, as can be observed in almost every phase of life” (Senge, 1990: 223), and 
argued that “our thought is incoherent and the resulting counter productiveness lies at 
the root of the world’s problems” (Bohm quoted in Senge, 1990: 223).  Bohm believed 
that “since thought is to a large degree collective, we cannot just improve thought 
individually” but “as with electrons, we must look on thought as a systematic 
phenomenon arising from how we interact and discourse with each other” (Bohm 
quoted in Senge, 1990: 223). 
 
Within this context “dialogue is aimed at the understanding of consciousness per se, as 
well as exploring the problematic nature of day-to-day relationship and communication” 
(Nichol quoted in Bohm, 1996: xx).  According to Nichol, Bohm’s work highlights 
several key components of dialogue: “shared meaning; the nature of collective thought; 
the pervasiveness of fragmentation; the function of awareness; the microcultural 
context; undirected enquiry; impersonal fellowship; and the paradox of the observer 
and the observed” (Nichol, quoted in Bohm, 1996: xx). 
 
In the nature of collective thought, Bohm proposes that a “pool of knowledge” – both 
tacit and overt – has accumulated throughout human evolution.  It is this pool of 
knowledge, says Bohm, that gives rise to much of our perception of the world, the 
meanings we assign to events, and indeed our very sense of individuality.  Such 
knowledge, or thought, moves independent of any individual, or even any particular 
culture – very much like a virus.  From this perspective, our attempts to resolve our 
problems through highly personalised analysis, or by attributing malignant qualities to 
“other” groups or individuals, are of limited validity.  What is called for, says Bohm, is to 
begin to attend to movement of thought in a new way, to look to places we have 
previously ignored.  Using the analogy of a river that is being perpetually polluted at its 
source, Bohm points out that removing the pollution downstream cannot really solve 
the problem.  The real solution lies in addressing what is generating the pollution at the 
source” (Nichol, quoted in Bohm, 1996: xxii).  Dialogue was, therefore, the most 
appropriate vehicle for tackling and addressing this task. 
 
Isaacs explores dialogue further from the perspective of David Kantor’s four player 
system.  Kantor developed a theory that “conversations reflect innate structures that 
only partly stem from the individual’s needs … they also reflect the unspoken needs of 
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the group” (Isaacs, 1999: 192).  Kantor suggested that “people take a stance not 
because they intend to, but because the conversation needs someone to fill that role” 
(pg. 192).  By using Kantor’s model, Isaacs asserts, “we can build an intuitive ability to 
predict how the conversation ‘wants’ to play out” (pg. 192), and points the way to four 
fundamentally different kinds of actions within a group: 
 
“When someone makes a move; they are initiating an action.  They 
carry, at least for the moment, the focus of the conversation.  Another 
person listening to this initial proposal might agree and want to 
support what is being said.  This person says so, and symbolically 
comes close to the first person.  The second person could be said to 
be following the first.  A third person, watching these two may agree, 
may think to him- or herself, There is something not quite right with 
this picture.  He or she steps in and opposes them, challenging what 
they are saying or proposing.  Symbolically, this third person might 
stand between the first two.  Finally, a fourth person, who has been 
observing the entire situation, and who has the advantage of having 
one foot in and one foot out of the circumstance, describes from his 
perspective what he has seen or heard.  This person may propose a 
way of thinking and seeing that expands everyone’s vision, and could 
be called a bystander.  He or she adds a valuable dimension to the 
conversation.  The term bystander here does not necessarily mean 
someone who is uninvolved or silent.  Bystanders can speak, but they 
provide perspective instead of taking a stand” (Isaacs, 1999: 192-3; 
emphasis carried). 
 
This ‘movement’ in the conversation denotes a ‘healthy’ interaction between dialoguers 
where “all the people in the conversation find themselves free to occupy any of the four 
positions at any time” (Isaacs, 1999: 193).  Moreover, according to Isaacs, “these four 
action positions, while valuable on their own, become extremely powerful guides for 
understanding the nature of action in dialogue as one links them to the underlying 
practices that lie behind them” (pg. 197).  Thus, “each position – move, follow, oppose 
and bystand – has a dialogue ‘practice’ that corresponds to it … for move it is the 
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quality of truthfulness and voice; for follow, listening; for oppose, respect; and for 
bystand, suspension” (pg. 197; emphasis carried). 
 
Isaacs goes on to argue that each of these actions “also has a generic set of 
“intensions” behind it” (pg. 200), and that our understanding of what these are allow us 
to “set aside our reactions to the noise of another’s communication and listen for what 
they are really trying to say” (pg. 200). 
 













































Isaacs maintains that “the art of thinking together is an exploration of the underlying 
motives and intentions of the people concerned” (Isaacs, 1999: 202), and believes that 
“the central spirit behind this approach is forgiveness – a stance that looks to the 
motives that a person intended regardless of how their actions appear” (pg 202).  In 
this understanding action is not necessarily disregarded, but rather participants of the 
dialogue come to the point of understanding action far better than they would have 
done otherwise. 
 
Ellinor and Gerard (1998), whose work on dialogue has also been largely influenced by 
Bohm (1996), define certain characteristics or behaviours that serve to contrast 
dialogue with other forms of discourse, such as discussion or debate (Ellinor and 
Gerard, 1998: 21): 
 
 

















e patterns of behaviour 
seeing the whole seeing the whole among the parts 
seeing the connection seeing the connections between the parts 
enquiry into assumptions enquiry into assumptions 
learning learning through enquiry and discourse 
shared meaning creating shared meaning among many 
 




















patterns of behaviour 
breaking down breaking issues / problems into parts 
seeing distinctions seeing distinctions between the parts 
justification justifying / defending assumptions 
advocacy persuading, selling, telling 
agreement gain agreement on one meaning 
 
In summarising what dialogue is, and what dialogue is not, Ellinor and Gerard point us 
to the notion that “dialogue is about gathering or unfolding meaning that comes from 
many parts, while discussion is about breaking the whole down into many parts” 
(Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 20). 
 
2.7 Dialogue Within Communities Of Practice: 
 
Lave and Wenger (1991) see language and dialogue as closely connected, where 
language is seen as having more to do with “legitimacy of participation and with access 
to peripherality than they do with knowledge transmission” (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 
105).  Learning to participate in a community of practice, such as those evidenced 
within the workplace, meant “learning how to talk (and be silent) in the manner of full 
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participants” (pg. 105).  Drawing from the work of Jordan (1989), who emphasises the 
importance of storytelling, they sketch a distinction between “talking about and talking 
within a practice” (pg. 109), where talking about is taken to mean the regaling of stories 
and community lore, and talking within to refer to the exchange of information 
necessary to the progress of ongoing activities (pg. 109).  According to Lave and 
Wenger, “inside the shared practice, both forms of talk fulfil specific functions: 
engaging, focusing, and shifting attention, bringing about coordination, etc., on the one 
hand; and supporting communal forms of memory and reflection, as well as signalling 
membership, on the other” (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 109).  Within this context, then, 
the purpose of dialogue was not to learn from talk but rather to learn to talk “as a key to 
legitimate peripheral participation” (pg. 109).     











In view of the fact that my study is, to a large extent, qualitative in that it involves an 
enquiry undertaken between and by “participants in a social situation” (Blaxter et al, 
1996: 63), it is important to provide a brief summary of who I am as an individual and to 
recognise the importance of my role and the influence it may bring to the study. 
 
I agree with Blaxter, confirmed by my own experience, that the case study research 
approach is about personal observation “which for some periods or events may 
develop into participation” (pg. 66), and so it becomes necessary to make certain 
things explicit to avoid any possibility of prejudice occurring.  Roman (2005) states that 
“qualitative research is very much about investigating the stories the investigator sees 
and hears; the investigator is an observer, a filter and an interpreter of the phenomena” 
(Roman, 2005: 34), and so it becomes easy to understand just how I, as the 
researcher, would be able to exert a significant influence on the research orientation 
and subsequent findings.   
 
3.1.1.2 Who Am I? 
 
My background is in short term insurance as an operations manager and as a 
divisional training manager where I am responsible for the overall supervision of further 
education, training and development of employees.  In this context I am closely 
involved in assessing and assisting individuals to improve their personal performance 
and ability, and to offer an informed insight into their ongoing development in terms of 
human performance gap analyses, personal career development choices across a 
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broad spectrum of career opportunities, and the ancillary support needed to pursue a 
selected course of action. 
 
To this end I hold formal qualifications as a certified ETD practitioner and as a subject 
matter expert in insurance, having been certified as a licentiate member of the IISA 
(Insurance Institute of South Africa).  I am also in possession of a bachelor’s degree in 
theology which, after completion, allowed me to work with individuals and groups in 
pastoral settings where I gained some experience observing individual behaviours and 
interpersonal group behavioural dynamics.  
 
I see myself as someone who is both interested and concerned about the personal 
welfare of individuals.  I am convinced of the fact that they each hold the key to their 
own potential and, with proper guidance and counselling, will be able to maximise their 
opportunities with the right motivation and through the ongoing enlargement of what I 
see as ‘their personal presence’, which I define as their emotional, intellectual and 
physical wellbeing.  I believe that everyone has the potential for growth and I see this 
possibility as something that exists on all levels of human interaction, in the individual, 
collective and wider life systems. 
 
As a manager within the organisation I am conscious of the influence that this 
positional role has, particularly with regard to the perceived relationship of power over 
participants / actors involved in the case study, the ethical considerations attaching to 
my selection of and engagement with participants, and my own objectiveness when 
selecting and interpreting the data.  I explore these areas in more detail below when 
reviewing my role as researcher, my research methodology and the research 
techniques used.    
 
3.1.1.3 My Views On Adult Education: 
 
I view adult education as a lifelong process that comes “from experience, is acted 
upon, and is functional” (Werner, 2004: 3).  This is a progressive philosophy of 
education espoused by Eduard Lindeman, who is said to have “laid the groundwork for 
a philosophy of adult education with his idea that education is not training for the future, 
but life itself, and that the learner’s experience is the most valuable part of education” 
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(pg. 3).  I also believe in the underlying principle that there exists “a structured set of 
truths that are definite and unchangeable” (pg. 2) and that “through reading and 
discussion of classic poetry, theology, scientific works, and other writings, learners are 
actively instructed” (pg. 2).  
 
I therefore see myself as a liberal-progressive educator who is drawn to both problem-
solving, cooperative learning techniques advocated in progressive adult education, yet 
equally ready to champion the contemplative, dialectic and critical reading and 
discussion methodologies being promoted through the liberal arts.   
 
3.1.1.4 Why Am I Motivated To Do This Study? 
 
In this particular study I have been motivated to explore the current theories and 
practices of dialogue, as observed within multinational organisations, and to 
‘experiment’ with their possibilities in organisations operating out of South Africa, partly 
because of an awakened interest in several claims attesting to their efficacy in old 
world cultures, such as those found in Africa (Isaacs, 1999: 24; Bohm, 1996: 18-9; 
Senge, 2006: 222), and partly because of an interest in the resurgence of dialogue as 
an organisational tool for learning transformation and change (Isaacs, 1999: 20; 
Kahane, 2004: 2-3; Brown, 2005: 5-7; Schein, 1993: 27).  I have also been intrigued by 
several studies and, in particular, those of William Isaacs, Edgar Schein and Jani 
Roman, whose doctoral thesis “A Study of Organisational Dialogue” allowed me to see 
possibilities for a similar undertaking in South Africa. 
 
3.1.1.5 My Role As ‘Researcher’: 
 
As a researcher who is currently employed by the organisation within which the data 
was collected, I am conscious of the need to remain extremely self-aware throughout 
the research process, and during the social interaction that this elicits (Lincoln quoted 
in Creswell, 1998: 194). 
 
In so doing I have tried to ensure that any potential biases borne by aspects relating to 
the determination of value, or the merit and worth of the data being observed, have 
been ‘neutralised’ by what Creswell (1998) refers to as “member-checking” (Creswell, 
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1998: 213).  This exchange was later strengthened by the introduction of what Creswell 
calls “the gatekeeper”, who is seen as “an individual who is a member of or has insider 
status within a cultural group” (Creswell, 1998: 117), The use of a gatekeeper, albeit a 
limited one, was used and adapted to represent an advanced form of member-
checking, allowing me to obtain access to insider information and perspectives in an 
attempt to neutralise the possible effects that my identity and status were having on the 
data.  In practice this involved extracting and clarifying information gleaned from the 
data by deliberately exposing them to the gatekeeper to thereby attempt to curtail or at 
best eliminate all forms of potential bias. 
 
In addition to this I involved a number of participants in the examination of “rough drafts 
of writing in which the[ir] actions or words … are featured” (pg. 213; addition mine).  I 
have also engaged in interviews with participants of the study to obtain clarity of 
information, where necessary.  This approach has helped me to ensure that the 
credibility of the data has not been compromised by subjective analysis ensuing from 
the fact that as researcher I was also a participant within the process.  Scriven and 
Patton (2005) expose this form of potential bias in evaluation as “not the most accurate 
evaluation because it is based on self-evaluation” (Patton and Scriven quoted in 
Fetterman, 2005: 7).  Fetterman, however, takes the position that Scriven and Patton’s 
standpoint is based on the presumption that external evaluation is “impartial, objective, 
and fair” (Fetterman, 2005: 7), which, he believes, is an unreasonable view, supported 
by the fact that, according to Greene, evidentiary research findings across a number of 
programmes illustrate that “all social program evaluators are inevitably on somebody 
else’s side, and usually that of the side of the evaluation question” (Greene quoted in 
Fetterman, 2005: 7). 
 
Whilst I agree, to a large extent with Greene and Fetterman’s observations, which 
serve as an overall point of departure for my own research, in the final analysis I do, 
however, agree with Scriven,  in that “as evaluators we need to examine whether what 
we think is happening is what is actually happening” (Scriven quoted by Wandersman 
and Snell-Johns, 2005: 422), which is what I have endeavoured to achieve and apply  
within my own personal practice with each observation session, and supported by the 
processes detailed above.  
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3.2 The Selected Research Approach: 
 
I have chosen to follow a qualitative approach in order to ensure and facilitate the 
discovery of reality associated with dialogue as experienced by participants within a 
large corporate banking organisation.  Within this framework I have been guided by a 
particular rationale, which assumes that ”Qualitative research is based on a 
constructivist philosophy that assumes that reality is a multilayer, interactive, shared 
social experience that is interpreted by individuals.  Reality is a social construction; that 
is, individuals and groups derive or ascribe meanings to specific events, persons, 
processes, and objects. People form constructions to make sense of their world and 
reorganise these constructions as viewpoints, perceptions, and belief systems.  In 
other words, people’s perceptions are what they consider real and thus what directs 
their actions, thoughts, and feelings” (McMillan and Schumacher, 2006: 315; cf. 
Zimmerman, 2007, paragraphs 1-5, pgs. 160-5, for a fuller treatment of Boghossian’s 
disputation against relativism and constructivism). 
 
I decided to follow this approach because I wanted to understand how dialogue was 
being ‘experienced’ or ‘understood’ by a group of participants working within a large 
corporate banking organisation operating out of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
 
3.3 The Research Design Summary: 
 
I was influenced in my research design by contrasting the objectives expressed in each 
of my research questions.  Firstly, I wanted to understand how dialogue was currently 
being practiced or experienced within my own organisation.  Secondly, I wanted to 
explore whether it would be possible to validate existing theoretical models of dialogue, 
such as those advocated by Schein (1993) and Isaacs (1999), through an observation 
of their implementation within my own organisation. 
 
This required a two-phased approach, which I drew from Robert Stake’s models of 
response-based evaluation and standards-based evaluation respectively.  In the first 
phase the goal was to understand what was happening or taking place within the focus 
group and thus placed significant emphasis on the responsiveness of participants in 
order to become better acquainted with participants’ knowledge and practice of 
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dialogue.  Stake refers to this type of case study as that requiring “interpretive-thinking” 
(Stake, 2004: 169), and sees the work of the researcher as one of making 
“comparisons of data, working through triangulation and meta-evaluation, re-examining 
issue by issue … [to make] assertions of merit and shortcoming” (pg. 174; addition 
mine).  In the second phase the goal was to assess what was happening or taking 
place within the focus group against a pre-determined standard or criteria of merit 
which had been drawn from a determination of ‘best practice’ espoused by the 
theoretical models of dialogue developed by Isaacs and Schein.  Stake refers to this 
type of case study as that requiring “critical-thinking” (Stake, 2004: 169), and sees the 
work of the researcher as one whose “aim is … to report that program outcomes have 
attained some level of merit” (pg. 174), through a process that looks to see “how 
different aspects of quality fit together” (pg. 174), and where “low performance is seen 
as cause for failure” (pg. 175). 
 
I used triangulation (cf., for example, Cohen and Manion, 1994: 233-250; Mason, 1996: 
42; Creswell, 1998: 213) to increase reliability and followed Stake’s approach to data 
analysis and interpretation involving analysis and synthesis through a process of 
naturalistic generalisation, which is “the act of drawing broad conclusions primarily from 
personal or vicarious experience” (Stake, 2004: pgs. 159-179). 
 
Within this context, and in order to answer my research questions: What is dialogue? 
and, How does dialogue occur within an organisation operating in South Africa? I 
developed two sets of supporting criteria by which I would evaluate the data to be 
collected.  The first set was used to support the data collected in phase two of 
dialogue; the second set was used in both phase one and two of dialogue.   
 
3.3.1 Phase 1 Of Dialogue – 
 
In phase one of dialogue I focused on an examination of the words, phrases, 
sentences, the structure and progressive stages of the dialogues themselves, which 
involved an in-depth study and analysis of the narrative.  Combining the work of 
analysis, broadly seen as breaking the total into its parts in order to get a better picture, 
with that of synthesis, described as the act of putting the parts together to make sense 
of the whole, I read the observation notes, journal entries, interviews, and field notes, 
0608395V - Masters Thesis – J Marais 49
repeatedly in order to get a clearer picture of the dialogues.  I summarised the 
information separately according to their source, and made further summaries of the 
summaries to allow the essential elements of the dialogue to emerge.  I transferred the 
summaries into a data matrix to allow for a wider lens of enquiry into the data itself, and 
for triangulation of the data across the differing methods of collection.   
 
3.3.2 Phase 2 Of Dialogue – 
 
In phase two of dialogue I developed a set of supporting criteria, which I derived from 
the theoretical models of dialogue espoused by Isaacs and Schein, with some 
additional descriptions obtained from the literature review itself.  The idea was to create 
themes or categories, based upon several features such as the descriptors used, 
behavioural patterns that were exhibited and/or evidenced,  and facial and verbal 
expressions and the like, with which to articulate a comprehensive representation of 
the various facets (criteria) which have contributed to the understanding of dialogue as 
a practice-field, and to use each series of themes or categories to serve as a unit of 
analysis which would determine whether the data observed either validates or 
invalidates the theoretical models used. 
 
‘Criteria’ in this sense is intended to mean that aspect of dialogue that has been 
recognised as valid components which support the overall theme and/or category 
within which dialogue is seen to exist or to have taken root.  For example, observation 
of one’s choice of language, seen as an observable criterion, lends itself to the overall 
foreshadowing of language as a theme or category within which dialogue as an 
observable phenomenon exists.  These criteria – i.e. the elements associated with 
one’s choice of language, including those elements associated with learned theories, 
notions, beliefs or conjectures drawn from sources external from the immediate 
conversation or dialogue – is then further extrapolated to determine historical, political 
and social influences and/or added behavioural attributes such as that associated with 
“listening”.   
 
In this phase the analysis of the data consisted of comparing the criteria gleaned from 
the narrative obtained by a reading of the observation notes, journal entries, interviews, 
and field notes, and assessing them against the dialogue-themes/categories in order to 
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determine their merit or worth.  Each theme or category thus conveyed an aspect or 
facet of the proposed theoretical model of dialogue as evidenced by observable 
criteria. 
 
In combining the work of synthesis with that of analysis, in the reverse of phase one of 
dialogue above, I was able to derive a composite picture of dialogue through an 
analysis of its constituent parts, thus:- 
 
 
Theme/Category: Criteria/Description: Source: 
 
dialogue as language – 
 
1. the choice of language we use 
… 
2. the context in which the 









observing the words and their 
derived meaning as determined by 
their own particular context … 




active listening to one another, to the ‘flow’ 












Roman, 2005: 19 
 
 
dialogue as relationship – 
 
1.  (i) I-it relationship 
     
     (ii) I-thou relationship 
 
 





(i) treating each other as objects or things 
(ii) treating each other as equals … in a 
direct and mutual relationship 
 
relationship of mutual trust 
relationship of humility 










Freire, 1970: 72  
 
dialogue as communally 
constructed – 
 
- thinking together 
- reflecting together 




incoherence is present, 
as well as frustration) 
 
 
observing a higher level of 
consciousness which enables the 
group to reach a shared level of 
meaning through a common 
thinking process (Schein, 1993: 30) 
 
- a way of channelling our differences into 
something new  
- developing common meaning / 
understanding 
- exploring, evolving meaning 
- exploring, evolving methods 
















Schein, 1993: 29 
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dialogue as consciousness of 
– 
(i) complexities of thinking 
(ii) complexities of language 






observation of our arbitrary categories of 







dialogue as reflective enquiry  
 












* advocacy: speaking what you think, 
speaking for your own point of view; 
* inquiry: looking into what you do not yet 
know, what you do not yet understand or 
seeking to discover what others see and 
understand that may differ from your point 
of view 
 
learning to make things explicit – explaining 
or revealing one’s own beliefs, or telling why 





Isaacs, 1991: 188 
Isaacs, 1991: 188 
Isaacs, 1991: 183 
 
 









- koinonia (impersonal fellowship) 
 
- authentic trust and openness – 
showing trust towards the others, or 
towards situation e.g.: taking risks, 
going to unknown areas, etc. 
 
- cohesive bond (turning to one another, 
displaying a sense of being together in 





De Maré in 
Matos, 2006 : 5 
Bohm et al, 













identifiable ‘gaps’ between what people 









Argyris quoted in 
Isaacs, 1999: 187 
 




exposing your reactions, 
impulses, feelings, and opinions 





anxiety or frustration behind the action or 
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seeing one’s own perceptions 
 
 
asking or repeating; explaining or revealing 
one’s own beliefs, or telling why people do 
what they do. 
 
 








asking or repeating; explaining or revealing 
one’s own beliefs, or telling why people do 
what they do. 
 
 






seeing the whole among the parts 
 
Ellinor and 
Gerard, 1998: 21 
 
seeing the connection between the parts 
inquiring into assumptions 
learning through inquiry and disclosure 
creating shared meaning among many 
 
 
discussion / debate 
 
breaking issues / problems into parts 
 
Ellinor and 
Gerard, 1998: 21 
 
seeing distinctions between the parts 
justifying / defending assumptions 
persuading, selling, telling 

































Supportive (evidenced as symbolically 










Challenging (evidenced as challenging what 










Suspend (evidenced as providing 
perspective; may propose a different way of 







3.3.3 Phases I And 2 Of Dialogue – 
 
I developed a second set of supporting criteria for phase one and phase two of 
dialogue, which I derived from the work of Jürgen Habermas.  Habermas posits the 
idea that there are five distinguishing rationale which serve as patterns of reflection in 
human beings (Habermas quoted in Mezirow, 1991: 104-111).  These ‘patterns of 
reflection’ can be discerned through a series of observable behaviours or comments 
that indicate the level of reflection that has been entered into or reached by the 
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individual or group being monitored.  I undertook to show that the behaviours thus 
recognised or monitored and observed during the dialogue sessions would provide a 
framework for understanding the degree to which participants were able to engage in 
reflective inquiry as a means of obtaining understanding so as to reach a common 





Frees us to act while 







… leads to automatic 




cognitive processes to 








… leads to 
introspection that 
draws from our prior 
knowledge, our 
experience and our 
beliefs in order to 
make an interpretation 
(does not involve any 













We assess what we 
have defined as our 
options in order to 
make the most 
appropriate next move 
Or 
It can occur only when 
the option stops 
because of a block, in 
which case it becomes 
retrospective 







… leads to deliberate 
appraisal or re-
appraisal of the 
‘grounds’ upon which 















Is an examination of 
how we perform these 
functions of perceiving, 
thinking, feeling, or 
acting and an 
assessment of our 








… leads to questions 
around an actions or 
series of actions 






















Leads us to question 
whether good or bad is 
an adequate concept 
for judging – involves 
our becoming aware of 








… leads to questions 
that explore the 
underlying 
assumptions or 
premise upon which 





3.4 The Research Methodology And Techniques: 
 
The information was gathered from several focus groups or six case studies made up 
of individuals who met together at weekly intervals over a four month period for 
approximately one hour.  Each group consisted of between 15 (fifteen) and twenty (20) 
individuals whose ethnicity comprised of eighty seven percent (87%) black, of which 
fifty percent (50%) were of African origin, and a further twenty six percent (26%) of 
Coloured extraction.  Seventy two percent (72%) were female, of which thirty three 
(33%) were African. 
 
Individuals were drawn from a random selection of employees who were working as 
insurance advisors, indentured as claims or underwriting technicians, and operating 
within the personal lines insurance sector.  Participants were invited to voluntarily 
participate in the research project through formal letters of invitation which outlined (a) 
the necessary levels of commitment and participation that were required, (b) the 
purpose and goal of the study in so far as it sought to examine and explore dialogue as 
a practice-field within organisational settings in which they were already participating, 
(c) assurances of individual confidentiality and anonymity and (d) the freedom to 
withdraw entirely from the project at any time or to withhold the use of their 
contribution, without fear of consequence or recrimination. 
 
Participants were also chosen by virtue of the fact that the company’s CSI (Customer 
Service Index) within the organisation’s personal lines insurance department had 
indicated that satisfaction levels were at an all-time low, with as few as fourteen 
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percent (14%) of customers indicating that they were satisfied with the way in which 
they had been dealt with by staff working within this division of the company.  This 
aspect served to identify individuals working within the department as ideal candidates 
with whom to explore the use of dialogue as a means of successfully integrating 
learning transfer into the complex, integrated and systems-oriented workplace 
environment to achieve the desired levels of operational success.   
 
I conducted each dialogue session, manually recording my observations by selecting 
observable phenomena based upon their qualifying criteria such as our choice of 
words, the way in which we see each other as evidenced by our behaviour, i.e. 
whether we treat others as equals as opposed to objects or things, writing down these 
observations, taking notes, and asking participants to complete dialogue journals to 
measure how they experienced the dialogue.  I also conducted some interviews in 
which I sought to extrapolate meaning from observed phenomena.  
 
I used photographs as a means of stimulating discussion.   Bessel et al (2007) 
distinguish the use of photographs in research as being either that of photolanguage or 
photovoice (Bessel et al, 2997: 559).   In photolanguage participants use photographs 
to facilitate personal expression and interaction within small groups (Burton and 
Cooney quoted in Bessell et al, 2007: 558).  Photolanguage is distinct from photovoice 
in that it “entrusts cameras to the hands of people to enable them to act as recorders” 
(Wang quoted in Bessell et al, 2007: 559).  I used both approaches in the sense that, 
firstly, participants were required to take photographs of their personal workspace 
depicting what for them was either “working” or “not working” in their efforts to achieve 
success in the workplace.  In this context the photographs represented each person’s 
“voice” or personal expression.  Secondly, the photographs thus taken were on display 
and eventually circulated amongst participants within the group, to smooth the 
progress of and facilitate discussion and personal interaction between individuals. 
 
At the outset, and for ethical considerations, all photographs depicting the images of 
people and or individuals within the group were removed.  These photographs were 
then discarded and ignored for the purposes of the study.  
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A number of ground rules were introduced to provide a sense of the expected degree 
of interpersonal conduct which would hopefully ensure everyone’s contribution and 
involvement; these were:- 
 
9 Individuals were encouraged to “listen’ to one another to gain a sense of each 
other’s contribution (Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 20); 
9 Individuals were asked to look for the cohesion or flow of the conversation so 
as to grasp a sense of “the whole” and to attempt to recognise inherent patterns 
or connections evident within the conversations themselves (Ellinor and Gerard, 
1998: 20); 
9 Individuals were asked to examine their own and others perceptions (opinions, 
beliefs, ideas) through the deliberate act of suspension (Isaacs, 1999: 143; 
Schein, 1993: 32; Bohm et al, 1991: 6); 
9 Individuals were encouraged to delve into and explore one another’s 
contributions with the aim of listening and learning from each other and thereby 
directing the conversation into new channels of understanding (Isaacs, 1991: 
188-9); 
 
In addition, a “talking-stick” was introduced to represent “an object passed from person 
to person in order to slow the pace of the conversation” (Senge quoted in Isaacs, 1999: 
xx), and as a means of ensuring that, when necessary, as in instances of disorder or 
disruptiveness, participants within the room were brought to order to allow the person 
in possession of the ‘talking-stick’ the command of the conversation. 
 
Finally, an added element of the research methodology was the introduction of what 
Brown, Isaacs et al (2005) refer to as the “cross-pollinating of ideas” (pg. 119) in which, 
through a process of recording and sharing of ideas from one session to another, 
participants consider “the linkages between their ideas and those of other teams” (pg. 
119).  In this sense the conversations were carried through between sessions and 
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3.5 Limitations And Assumptions Of The Study: 
 
The following limitations influenced the direction of this study and also served as a 
point of departure for the researcher: 
 
 The data of only one organisation within a defined sector were utilised as a 
practical example of “best practice”, in this case the personal lines insurance 
division within the business sector.  This approach can hamper attempts to 
generalise results. 
 The data collected failed to support any meaningful connection between 
dialogue as experienced within indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and 
dialogue as experienced within an organisation located within South Africa.  
The lack of any real studies or further exploration within IKS may hamper 
attempts to measure or eliminate potential influences for determining a 
measure of best practice for dialogue within a South African context. 
 
The following research assumptions influenced the direction of this study and also 
served as a point of departure for the researcher: 
 
 The contributions of Jack Mezirow towards the theories of adult learning based 
on changes in consciousness, which “deal with the mental construction of 
experience and inner meaning” (Merrian and Caffarella, 1991: 259), have been 
taken to be authoritative in this field.  Mezirow’s theories, based in large 
measure on the work of German critical social theorist and philosopher, Jürgen 
Habermas, have been widely used by the researcher.  In particular, Habermas’ 
understanding of reflection (Mezirow, 1991, Chapter 4: Making Meaning 
Through Reflection). 
 The theories of Isaacs (1999) and Schein (1993) on the theory and practice of 
dialogue in organisations have been regarded as authoritative in this field.  Both 
have been influenced by the work of David Bohm (1996), whose ideas on 
collective thought have been accepted as being uncontested for the purposes 
of this study. 





4.1  Introduction 
 
In presenting these research findings I find myself being drawn to two interviews that, 
for me, encapsulate the spirit of dialogue when seen to be present.  The first belongs to 
Mary1 who relives her rich experiences with her mother, which, more often than not, 
was played out in the intimacy and privacy of the bathroom at home: 
 
Mary: We would be in the bathroom at home, my mother perched on the edge of 
the bath.  I would be telling her about the things that were then currently 
happening in my life.  She would listen.  I would talk.  Sometimes she would 
tell me something from her own life that would relate to mine.  Other times 
she would talk to me about something about herself I had never known 
before.  I remember it as a special and intimate moment of sharing and 
caring; it was beautiful. (Interview, I20071) 
    
For Mary, a white middle aged office worker, dialogue involved rare moments that were 
characterised by feelings of relationship, warmth, security, and love. 
 
The second was told to me by Iain, a young coloured MBA graduate in his mid-thirties, 
whose life was characterised by vague feelings of disconnection and isolation suffered 
during the apartheid years: 
 
Iain: I remember how we would sit together with my father and his friends, and 
family, none of us divided by status or by our earnings, or by our lack of it, 
or by being well-off.  We were simply drawn together because we felt a 
connection, a bond of fellowship.  In those days we seemed drawn together 
by what was happening in the country at the time and we would talk and 
discuss the latest developments.  We talked about politics, about a better 
future, about “us”.  No one felt they were better than anyone else; there was 
no power struggles, no separation of race, no hidden agendas.  We felt as 
though we were being brought together by a common purpose. (Interview, 
I20073). 
                                                     
1 All actual names of participants have been changed.  
0608395V - Masters Thesis – J Marais 59
 
With Iain, dialogue represented an opportunity to connect with like-minded individuals 
who felt something in common, and whose experience of their interaction with one 
another was devoid of any barriers to communication through feelings of sharing in 
each other’s situation. 
 
Each account brings into sharp focus not only aspects of dialogue obtained from a 
review of the literature, but also those borne by the results of the case studies 
themselves. 
 
4.2  The Conversations Within The Room: 
 
4.2.1 Prelude To Dialogue: 
 
In the first two weeks of dialogue participants struggled to converse with one another.  
Sessions were punctuated by frequent silences and long periods of awkwardness in 
which individuals appeared to experience a sense of disorientation and a lack of 
purpose and direction: 
 
It should be noted that in these extracts of the dialogues (pgs. 59-60; 61-63; 65-66; 68-
72; 74-76) the use of a loose colour scheme is applied, not in any strict sense of a 
formal ‘colour code’ but as a means of documenting particular criteria and/or themes 
which emerge as movements within the flow of the conversations and paralleled from 
excerpts of observations drawn from within the literature review. 
 
 










[move] - 1 
[move] - 2 
[move] - 3 





Silence.  Participants are still ‘finding’ each other.  More silence.  Do I 
step in?  Fidgeting.  Participants glancing toward each other.  
Furtively?  My imagination?  Smiles.  What now?  Further silence.  
Expectation.  Late stragglers arrive, held up by workloads.  Chatter 
erupts. 
“Why are you late?” “Where is _____.?” 
Some ask what is happening.  What have they missed?  I explain.  
“Are we going to discuss the photographs we all took?”  
Yes, okay.  I remind them about why they took the photographs.  I re-
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no playfulness 
2 - defensive 
routine 
















[move] – 4 





talking to each other.  There is genuine confusion.  Or is it inertia?  
Several mini-conversations have begun.  What now?  I remember the 
“talking stick”.  I ask that only one conversation take place at a time 
and request that the person wishing to “command the floor’s 
attention” so to speak, ensure that they are first holding the stick; 
once finished they are to return it to the centre of the table.  The next 
speaker is to do the same, and so on.  Silence.  Embarrassed, 
awkward silence?  Slight giggling.  I suggest that participants decide 
upon which photographs they would like to talk about, and that 
someone initiate the conversation. 
… 
 
Participants look at the photographs – still displayed on the walls and 
grouped by numbers.  A few select their photographs.  Some are still 
looking.  No-one appears to know what they are supposed to do once 
they have selected their photographs.  Do they know what is 
expected?  25 minutes have elapsed.    
“Is this a training session?  I mean I get that we are supposed to be 
discussing the photographs, but are you going to start?” 
I once again discuss why we are here.  I tell them that the purpose of 
the meetings is to dialogue about issues that are of common 
interest/concern to everyone.  I tell them again about my role – i.e. to 
record what happens as best I can, but that this is their session, that 
they are to engage in whatever way they deem fit, telling them that 































In these early conversations individuals appeared to be unable to engage in the act of 
conversing with one another.  Kantor’s four-player system (Isaacs, 1999: 192-3), was 
noticeable by its absence in that participants lacked initiative [there were no movers], 
lacked support [there were no followers], were devoid of challenge [there were no 
opposers] and did not elicit any conscious suspension of individual points of view [there 
were no bystanders].  Talk fizzled into lapsed periods of silence, fidgeting, giggling, 
outbreaks of mini-conversations and awkwardness.  As an observer I was unable to 
discern any apparent bond of fellowship or koinonia (De Maré in Matos, 2006: 5) or 
cohesiveness (Bohm et al, 1991: 4), and individuals by and large expressed 
themselves in terms of defensive routines (Isaacs, 1999: 370), asking obvious 
questions about their purpose within these sessions and their apparent reason for 
being brought together as a group, an aspect which had already been discussed with 
them at length.  Their interaction was marked by incoherence (Isaacs, 1991: 9, 19; 
Bohm et al, 1990:5) and frustration as seen through the disruptiveness within the group 
and their inability to formulate any meaningful topic for conversation.  They treated one 
another with mild forms of accusation (Bohm et al, 1991: 6), and questioning [“why are 
you late?’, “What is happening?”, “Is this a training session?”], and were not really 
listening to one another (Burbules in Roman, 2005: 19).  In this they displayed a clear 
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lack of faith in either themselves or in the dialogue process (Freire, 1970: 72; Buber in 
Roman, 2005: 60), and did not seem to view each other as equals (defensiveness, 
suspicion) (Bohm et al, 1991: 6). 
 
In exploring my observations the focus of conversation was channelled by some into 
expressions of personal fear, the fear of being able to talk freely and openly within the 
organisation.  Participants admitted that they were weary of the process in spite of 
having volunteered to attend and cited cases where frequent initiatives by 
management had come to nothing and had petered out after a while.  They were 
disillusioned and wondered whether the proposed dialogue sessions would meet a 
similar fate.  Others admitted that they felt a little awkward and disoriented because 
they were not used to being given an opportunity to interact with each other in this way 
before and it felt strange; they felt “rusty” and did not know what to do. 
 
Thabo: “Usually they talk, we listen.  And when we do talk, we might as well 
be talking to a brick wall” (Interview I200710). 
 
In the following rounds of dialogue the conversation, of necessity, turned to an open 
discussion of individuals’ fears and reservations around the dialogue process, and 
brought to light some of the perceived barriers to internal communication.  It also 
highlighted the fact that dialogue was indeed language, the words we choose to use as 
well as the context within which they are used (Bakhtin in Hamston, 2006: 57).  Within 
the group the language of choice was steeped in the historical, political and social 
inequalities of apartheid (pg. 57): 
 
 


















“We are afraid to say anything.  When we do, we pay for it” 
[I ask what is meant by this] 
“Well, for instance, if I challenge my manager or supervisor, then 
somewhere down the line I feel it.  My PD is affected” 
“I can relate.  I have experienced being literally “shut out” by my 
supervisor when I disagreed with her.  When I offer an opinion or 
challenge the way that something is being carried out, she thinks I 
am attacking her personally!  I think managers and supervisors feel 
threatened if anyone opposes their views, or their way of doing 
things” 
“I thought I was the only one!  Only yesterday, I had a run-in with 














































































loss adjusters.  I feel that they should be able to work directly with us 
instead of always having to be appointed by the supervisor.  I mean 
it makes sense to be able to interact with them individually on the 
merits of the claim.  As it is, we get the information second-hand, 
and they give their report direct to the supervisor who vets their 
recommendations and then gives them on to us”  
“It’s crazy, right!  The so-called company values say that we have 
the right to question and to challenge each other … but in practice, 
that just isn’t allowed to happen.  In practice the manager is 
ALWAYS right; I think that they see themselves as the only ones 
with enough sense to know what’s right for the department”. 
“I think that supervisors feel that we are too ignorant to get the job 
done.  They think we are stupid.  That we have no value to add to 
the process.  If I try and suggest things, or recommend changes to 
something, it is immediately viewed with suspicion.  And God help 
anyone who comes up with a better idea!  What the supervisor or 
manager says, goes!  It’s like working in a dictatorship!” 
[Nods of agreement; eruption of smaller conversations.  This 
comment seems to have hit a nerve]. 
“We aren’t seen as equals, as people who have something to 
contribute.  It’s funny.  On the one hand we are being asked to 
contribute our ideas, but on the other hand we know that whatever 
we say is ignored.  We go through the motions and the rituals, but in 
the end management simply implement their own ideas” 
“I sometimes feel that my contribution, if I happen to say anything, is 
‘stolen’ and used later on.  It is changed sometimes, sort of 
camouflaged, and presented as one of the management team’s 
idea.  I get angry and discouraged.  Which prevents me from 
wanting to contribute anything!  I just end up quietly retreating into 
my own little corner of the office” 
“Let’s face it, on the surface we are made to believe that we, and the 
contributions we make, are valued and appreciated, but below the 





“It’s frustrating!  I feel that it’s also because the majority of us are 
black.  It’s true!  The perception ‘out there’ is that black people are 
not capable of doing anything meaningful.  We are still being treated 
as incapable of doing anything.  Take a look around you.  There are 
more Whites, Coloureds and Indians in supervisory and 
management positions than there are black people.  We are being 
overlooked.  And, if you ask anyone about why it looks that way, 
then all hell breaks loose”. 
“And then, of course, we all tend to stop talking.  It’s no use and, 
actually, it becomes dangerous” 
“The company hides behind affirmative action when it suits them, 
because it is acceptable that everyone who was previously 
disadvantaged fills up the available positions; it’s just interesting that 
there are no black people out there who seem to qualify, or who are 
considered good enough.  It affects me.  I become frustrated and 





“I feel that we are constantly being measured!  It makes me feel like 
I am being policed” 
“Absolutely!  I agree that there must be some kind of measurement 
in place so that we are able to gauge the level of our efficiency and 















































































[Some laughter.  I get the sense that what is being shared is a 
watershed from the point of view that it marks a level of agreement 
and camaraderie between those who are present] 
“The trouble is that I feel quite disempowered!  I become too scared 
to do anything in case I end up making a mistake.   It’s as though we 
are working for a dictatorship!” 
[More laughter]. 
“No really, it is!  I am ‘driven’ by fear every day; fear that I will not be 
able to show something for what I have done.  Even fear of failing!” 
“I think that, sometimes, the whole system is designed to make us 
fail.  My supervisor is happy when I do something wrong; somehow 
it makes him justified.  He believes that I am ‘proving’ that I am not 




















These dialogues, the character and nature of which quickly devolved into a series of 
monologues while dialoguers engaged in repeatedly moving the direction of the 
conversation to “tell their side of the story” (Isaacs, 1991: 188), were punctuated with 
spells of advocacy (convincing, deliberation) (Isaacs, 1999; Schein, 1993), 
characterised by a great deal of telling, selling and persuading of individuals’ points of 
view (Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 21).  Dialoguers provided little time or opportunity for 
the conversation to ‘settle’ and thereby allow for cohesion (thinking together), 
agreement [follow] or disagreement [oppose], neither in the form of controlled 
discussion, skilful conversation or reflective dialogue.  There was also no confronting of 
one’s own and other’s points of view, nor any real exploration of any of the opinions 
expressed.  
 
Conversation was punctuated with a lack of fellowship (De Maré in Matos, 2006: 5; 
Bohm et al, 1991: 4), mistrust (Freire, 1970: 72), and a lack of faith (pg. 70) either in 
themselves and their ability, or in the dialogue process.  Strong feelings of social and 
political inequality (Bakhtin in Hamston, 2006: 57) surfaced and participants were 
affected by what they perceived to be the company’s espoused theory of action versus 
their theory-in-use (Schön and Argyris in Isaacs, 1999:187), which they identified with 
negatively; in this they also revealed the fact that their particular context was, perhaps, 
coloured by their historical inequality which had been imposed upon them by apartheid 
(Bakhtin in Hamston, 2006: 57). 
 
Individuals spoke of being afraid to speak openly and unguardedly when interacting 
with management and each other.  They based their fears upon lived experiences that 
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had led to significant levels of disassociation and feelings of isolation and frustration.  
These feelings were exacerbated by perceptions of racism and an over-emphasis on 
performance measurement, which had had the effect of creating widespread opinions 
of being disempowered and, in some cases, of general unworthiness.  Dialoguers 
believed that their immediate superiors were ingenuous and that a clear distinction 
existed between the company’s stated or expressed values and those that were being 
lived out or experienced.  The negative effect upon the perceived value of entering into 
any form of communication or dialogue within the organisation was palpable, and 
discussions that allowed participants the opportunity to explore their points of view 
became necessary, so as to clear the way for the further exploration of dialogue to 
become possible. 
 
This was achieved by, firstly, reassuring dialoguers that their contributions would be 
treated in the strictest confidence, secondly, that an action-plan would be created to 
monitor and gauge the successes, or otherwise, of these regular contact sessions and, 
thirdly, by gradually showing participants that I, as the facilitator, could be trusted and 
that my word was, in effect, ‘my bond’. 
 
4.2.2 Phase 1 Of Dialogue 
 
As the dialogue sessions progressed and conversations around the various 
photographs ensued, it became evident that not all of the issues being highlighted 
would result in dialogue.  Some of the focus areas such as “untidiness”, “absenteeism”, 
“understaffing”, “lack of respect”, “lack of communication by and from management”, 
“lack of urgency”, “too much red tape”, “teambuilding”, and “passing the buck”, quickly 
devolved into a debate / discussion of the topic and an immediate and recognisable 
solution or decision was reached and implemented.  In the case of ‘untidiness’ for 
example, once debated and discussed, the matter was recorded in terms of the agreed 
action-plan and instructions relayed to the responsible parties concerned to arrange 
and organise the immediate upliftment and storage of all finalised files and files 
currently stacked and strewn around the offices in boxes, to the company’s external 
storage facility.  In like manner the majority of the issues photographically recorded 
were resolved. 
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In the area of systems and technology the opportunities for dialogue came to the fore 









“The telephones aren’t working!” 
“Tell me about it!  Yesterday I got cut off at least three times while 
talking to customers” 
” It sucks.  Who gets it in the neck when that happens? We do!” 
“Exactly!” 
“The trouble is that everything doesn’t seem to be working at the 
moment.  The fax machine at our end of the office is constantly getting 
fixed.  It’s always out of order.  I’m getting sick of if” 
“I know.  Our Xerox machine doesn’t work, either.  It’s forever ‘broken’, 
and the technicians don’t know how to fix it” 
“I don’t think they know what they are doing!” 
“It’s like the IT system!  The technicians haven’t a clue!  I don’t think 
that they are competent enough!  They don’t know their jobs!” 
“There is big difference between being a qualified technician, as 
opposed to being an IT administrator.  The IT people are just clerks.  I 
don’t think they know anything about the system” 
“That’s a bit harsh!” 
“I swear!  Whenever IT is involved, nothing happens and there are 101 
excuses why they can’t help.  It always ends up being reported to the 
help-desk and they have to send out outside technicians to find out 
what’s wrong.  Then it works for a while and, before long, we are back 
to square one” 
“I think there are too many people allocated to one machine.  The paper 
volumes are too much!  There are always paper jams and eventually 
the machine just stops working” 
“Welcome to our department!  Everybody stops working, full stop! I 
mean, who wants to work anyway?  The machines aren’t working, there 
are boxes and files littered everywhere, everything looks to be in a 
mess, no wonder no-one feels the inclination to work!” 
“Listen to what you are saying!  How can there be a connection 
between the mess and the untidiness in the office, and the fact that the 
fax machines aren’t working; I mean come on!  I think that you might be 
able to link the general state of the office to the fact that no-one 
appears to have the inclination to do anything about it.  I think that the 
managers and supervisors, who are supposed to be responsible and 
accountable for ensuring that the office equipment is in working order, 
don’t give a fig because they can’t even give attention to the state of 
their surroundings.  However I don’t think you can say that because the 
office is in a mess that is way the machines, the printers, the Xeroxes, 
the faxes, are all in a mess too” 
“Yeah, maybe you are right.  But I do think that the office has something 
to do with it … I mean, like we saw earlier, untidiness leads to an untidy 
mind!” 
“Oh please!  It’s not the same thing.  The machines are overworked, 
clear and simple!  Someone ought to do some kind of analysis to find 
out if the sizes of the machines are adequate for our purposes.  I mean, 
if the machines are constantly on the blink then either they are just 
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company seems to believe that they can”. 
“That’s what I say!  Does anyone know the kind of volumes these 
machines are supposed to be able to give?  I think that the fax 
machines overheat because of the amount of traffic that comes through 
them and that is what causes them to eventually jam.  Same with the 
photocopy machines, they overheat with the amount of copies they are 
being used to make, and then start jamming” 
“Well, if the supervisors and managers took an interest in our 
surroundings, they would be paying attention to the underlying causes 
that are competing with each other to turn these machines on their 
heads!” 
“Didn’t we say earlier that the IT system itself was also part of the 
problem.  The thing is so archaic that I wonder whether the command-
prompts are designed to accomplish their tasks.  I sometimes think that 
they are unable to queue correctly and cause the machines to jam!” 
“You might have a point!  Maybe that is why the telephones are also 
cutting out!  Isn’t there an overriding ‘housekeeping’ system that 
controls everything? 
“I really don’t think so!  I think we are starting to go off the point.  There 
isn’t really anything to discuss here.  The machines are not working 
because, as some of us have already said, they are overworked!  Pure 
and simple!  I think we should get the technicians out here again to do 
some kind of benchmarking for us; to find out how many faxes these 
machine are supposed to be able to receive, how many people are 
meant to be allocated to each machine, and so on.  The same with the 
photocopy machines.  Then we need to motivate for additional 
equipment” 
“I’ve never thought of the phone lines being affected by the inadequacy 
of the queuing system; I think the system stores about 10 callers per 
extension … which is a lot.  Maybe this is not happening and so they 
are simply being cut off when we eventually pick up their call.  I think I 
should check with switchboard and find out if that is possible”. 
“I think that the PABX system itself is the main issue here.  The system 
is supposed to bank all the callers in a queue, up to about five or ten 
callers.  But I don’t think it does”. 
“Look it doesn’t really matter what the system is supposed to do or not.  
The callers are being cut off while we are busy talking to them, not 
because they end up in a queue and are then somehow dropped from 
the system”. 
“No, not from where I am sitting!  My clients also complain that they are 
being cut off while holding on for someone within the department to 
answer their call.  They are put on hold, get given the system music and 
the voice-over to listen to, and then suddenly end up loosing their 
connection” 
“Ja, dis waar!  Our clients have the same problem; and when we 
complain to line about the issue, they don’t seem to have any answers 
or solutions” 
“Not only that, we end up getting it in the neck!  I was once told that 
they had ‘investigated’ the problem and had found out that some of the 
staff were taking their telephones off the hook, or were hiding behind 
their were talking to no-one … and had callers lining up to speak to 
them”. 
“Is that true?” 
“I don’t know.  I can believe it of some of the staff, though”. 
“I don’t believe it!  I haven’t seen anyone doing that.  It’s insane! 
“Look, I don’t know if it is true; the thing is that some of the staff were 
apparently caught out by switchboard” 
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In this phase of dialogue the aim of the study was to determine how dialogue was 
experienced by participants in their natural, unaffected setting.  My observations 
allowed me to understand the way in which dialoguers interacted with one another.  In 
this way I was able to recognise patterns of behaviour and establish the level of contact 
between participants. 
 
David Kantor’s “four player system” was immediately discernable as participants began 
to interact, their conversations reflecting the innate structures of telling and directing 
[move], agreeing [follow], providing alternative perspectives or views, sometimes 
simply expanding on those already presented by others [bystand], and challenging 
[oppose] what was being said (Isaacs, 1999: 192-3).  Participants engaged in a fair 
amount of advocacy, ensuring that they were able to speak for their own point of view 
to make certain that their individual ideas, opinions and positions within the so-called 
debate were made known.  In achieving this I observed what Isaacs referred to as 
“explicit thinking” taking shape (Isaacs, 1991: 189), in the sense of participants’ 
explaining or revealing their points of view.  I also observed participants engaging in a 
fair amount of breaking down issues and problems into their constituent parts in trying 
to ‘name’ the problems as they saw them (Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 21), and they 
followed their observations with attempts to justify and defend their various theories.  
This was observed in language that sought to persuade, sell, and tell each other of the 
basis of their assertions (pg. 21).  In this sense the conversation clearly resembled a 
discussion or debate and did not resemble the characteristics of a dialogue.  At some 
point in the discussion several mild forms of inquiry were attempted through the 
introduction of participants’ questions around issues they were uncertain about, but 
these were not followed through by any in-depth appraisal or by any determined efforts 
to discover what others may see or understand of the situation. 
 
The session was disrupted by ‘incoherence’ (Issacs, 1991: 9; Bohm et al, 1990: 5), a 
term I have used to describe the lack of collective engagement or of thinking together.  
Topics, whilst loosely aligned with the overall subject matter (technology), nevertheless 
fluctuated wildly from one extreme to the next – involving telephones, fax machines, 
photocopy machines, IT personnel and the like – and did not follow any logical 
sequence or determined attempts at finding resolution or understanding.  Once again, 
participants were preoccupied with merely projecting their individual points of view and 
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limited their further involvement by not entering into a more thorough investigation or 
exploration of the problems / issues being tabled for discussion. 
 
I was unable to observe any detailed form or attempts at reflection (Habermas in 
Mezirow, 1991: 104-111), other than self-reflection (Bohm et al, 1991: 6), as 
participants drew upon previous forms of knowledge and experience to describe their 
observation of the issues and problems they were busy presenting to the group for 
discussion. 
 
4.2.3  Phase 2 Of Dialogue: 
 
In phase two of dialogue the aim of the study was to try and replicate aspects of 
dialogue derived from what was considered to be the structure of “best practice” as 
determined by aspects of the literature review.  In particular, Isaacs’s model of dialogue 
was used to explain to participants how dialogue is achieved, and to describe to them 
elements of behaviour and communication considered necessary for dialogue to be a 
success.  In this context participants were introduced to Isaacs’s model of dialogue as 
a “tool” of measurement and the brief characteristics and behaviours attributed by 
Ellinor and Gerard as the components of dialogue were explained from the perspective 
of identifying the differences between discussion / debate and dialogue. 
 
These dialogue sessions were introduced during the final phase of the dialogues and 
allowed for only two meetings to be scheduled, one of which is summarised below for 
assessment and comparison: 
 






“Is anyone experiencing any problems with EFT?” 
“Do you seriously want us to answer that?  Does snow fall in 
Antarctica?” 
“I’ll take that as a yes?” 
“I don’t think it does; snow in Antarctica that is!” 
“Of-course it does!” 
“No ways!” 
“Okay, check it out!  Anyway everything is melting away now, due to 
global warming, so while it does, lets at least try and save ASTI” 
























































































“I reckon ASTI is doomed.  Let’s stick with EFT!” 
“I meant EFT!” 
[More laughter] 
“My problem with EFT is that I have to keep requesting the IT 
department to ‘override’ the system so that I can access the insured’s 
account directly to correct the mistakes!” 
“I know.  That’s because the system is blocked to avoid unauthorised 
access.  Anyway, that still doesn’t explain the problem we are 
experiencing with the system” 
“I don’t understand” 
“Each time that we make any amendments to the system, the client is 
being automatically debited” 
“How do you mean?” 
“When I change, say, the insured’s risk address, the system activates a 
change in the premium and signals these amendments to EFT.  The 
changes are captured via mag-tape, and the client is debited during the 
overnight run-off” 
“So!  If the risk address changes, so does the risk profile, which might 
trigger an increase in the premium” 
“Yes, but I am talking about changes that do not affect the risk profile” 
“I think the example of the risk address is confusing.  Sometimes 
amendments to the risk address don’t necessitate amendments to the 
risk profile.  I mean if you move from Florida to Florida Glen, nothing 
happens.  EFT is creating problems with a variety of policy changes, 
not just the change in the risk address” 
“Okay, let me explain.  Yesterday I needed to amend the insured’s 
policy by issuing a roof endorsement.  The insured’s account was 
debited with a new premium.  This morning the client phoned in, 
furious!  He was angry about the fact that we had taken off his monthly 
premium twice in ten days” 
“That crazy!  So you are telling me that every time we do something to 
the insured’s policy, regardless of whether it changes the insured 
profile, the system raises a debit against the insured’s account?” 
‘How come you don’t know about it?” 
“I don’t really deal with the underwriting endorsements.  My involvement 
with EFT is limited to renewals.  I just haven’t been able to understand 
why the renewal premiums have been double-debited, and when the 
insured complains, I refer them to the credit-controller to sort out.  I’ve 
never really understood what had happened!” 
“It doesn’t affect all accounts.  So if you haven’t come across it, it 
means that your portfolio falls outside its scope” 
“I think it only affects VPMS” 
“How do we know?” 
“We don’t.  Each of the requests that we put through to Gillian have all 
been confirmed as belonging to VPMS.  She spoke to me yesterday 
about it” 
“Does Gillian understand why it is happening?” 
“Yes and no.  Gillian seems to think that something in ASTI is triggering 
the rating field and doesn’t know where to look to find what is causing it 
to happen” 
“I don’t understand it.  Why would only VPMS be affected?” 
“Has anyone had to correct an endorsement belonging to any of the 
other products?” 
“No” 
[Others nod their heads in agreement.  It is established that everyone 
who is present works across most of the product disciplines; each have 
hardly ever been affected; although it is sometimes noted that double-
debits can become a problem with lapsed policies.  These require a 
different handling process.  All agree that it isn’t really the same thing 
as the current EFT ‘crisis’]  
“Well I think it has something to do with the system modifications that 






























































































































“No!  That doesn’t make sense!” 
“Yes it does!” 
“How?  How can loss adjusters affect EFT?  They have nothing to do 
with accounts, just like I don’t really have anything to do with EFTs.  I 
get involved at renewal, and I only recently got to hear about the 
problem when I started getting complaints from clients about the fact 
that their premiums had been debited twice against their account” 
“I know, it’s strange.  But hear me out.  The system now allows loss 
adjusters the ability to raise debits against the insured’s policy account, 
for reimbursements such as emergency towing fees.  I think that when 
they activate payment, something is pulled through inadvertently into 
the payment screen” 
“That’s not right!  The payments that loss adjusters are likely to make 
does not pull through from the policy premium account, but from the 
claims suspense account.  So why would they trigger anything when 
making a payment?” 
“Guys, I think we are going off the point.  Double-debits cannot be 
triggered by a claims payment.  Full stop.  The entire accounting 
process would be in jeopardy if it did!  No, there has to be another 
explanation” 
“Does anyone know what processes are involved when the loss 
adjusters make a payment?  Is it the same as claims or underwriting?” 
“Claims” 
“Yip, claims.  Access to MA PAY operates off the claims platform” 
“Okay, but then they can’t be affecting the EFT process.  The ledgers 
are different for underwriting and claims; otherwise claims consultants 
would be able to submit fraudulent claims by manipulating the system!” 
“Yes, of-course!.  It has to be something else” 
“What happens when you issue an endorsement?  I mean how does it 
change anything?  What would cause something in the process to 
activate a further EFT?” 
“That’s what we are trying to resolve!” 
“I know!” 
“I mean that it might be an idea for us to run through the process to see 
if we can identify anything that doesn’t look right.  If we cannot find 
anything, then at least we will know that it isn’t the process, and we can 
let IT look into it” 
“We tried IT, they say we are the culprits” 
“How come?” 
“Not sure.  They seem to think that we are activating the mag-tape by 
something that we are triggering manually” 
“But what in the process would cause this to happen?  What do we do 
when we activate an endorsement?” 
“Well, firstly, the policy moves into draft status to enable the 
underwriting clerk to initiate the endorsement” 
“Yes, the system moves the policy from active to inactive because only 
then can we access the underwriting file.  We cannot work on the policy 
while appears on the operations drive” 
“Okay, then what?” 
“The underwriter pulls through the standard endorsement file and 
selects the one they want – i.e. roof endorsement, or lack of 
maintenance – and then deselects their choice from the drop-box.  If 
they don’t want to do a standard endorsement, then they can deselect 
the free-form option and type the endorsement themselves” 
“We can also select the Microsoft 2003 editor if we are going to use 
free-form text” 
“Okay, so let’s say that you are doing a standard endorsement, then 
what?” 
“I deselect the download option from the drop-box menu and populate 
the electronic fields that are opened up from the system.  The 
endorsement is automatically downloaded via the policy schedule and 






























































































































“We also have to work off the rating screen so that we have pulled 
through the premium increase” 
“The rate is manually adjusted and then pulled through the system” 
“If it is a free-form endorsement then there isn’t going to be an 
automatic rate on the system.  We then have to manually enter the rate 
to be applied so that the system can pull this through into the rating 
platform” 
“Who calculates the premium?” 
“Underwriters.  We apply a manual rate and then populate the rating net 
of VAT.  The system then calculates this rate against the sum insured 
and includes VAT.  Simple” 
“Then what?” 
“The underwriter is supposed to check the file and then save it to draft 
status on the system.  It then goes through to the supervisor to activate” 
“Does the supervisor pull the electronic record through from draft into 
active status?” 
“Yes” 
“So when does that happen?” 
“As soon as the file has been checked” 
“I can’t see how anything that we have discussed can trigger the EFT 
file” 
“We had a problem last year with the run-off of Virgin Active, where 
their policies were ring-fenced for gradual transfer to indirect.  Some of 
the files were causing problems with the premium debits and credits, 
and when we checked we discovered that it had something to do with 
the temporary status of the files” 
“You mean the policy status?” 
“Yes” 
“I remember the problem.  What did IT do there?  Can you remember?” 
“It wasn’t an IT issue.  They couldn’t find anything from their side.  As 
far as I can remember the problem reverted to underwriting department.  
Anyway, before we could get to the bottom of it, the files transferred into 
the new online platform with idirect, so it was a matter of ‘case closed’” 
“I actually think that you might be onto something though.  Do you 
remember the problems we had with the old Volkskas Bank clients?  
When we transferred their records into ASTI?  They also experienced 
hiccups in the process, and it turned out to be a really simple solution” 
“Oh yes!  I remember!  If I can recall correctly, the system defaulted 
when the policy status remained in draft overnight!  What happens is 
that ASTI automatically pulls through all the draft accounts from draft 
into active status before it can read the file.  That makes sense!” 
“Hang on.  Are we saying that if the policy is not activated by the 
supervisor on the same day, then the system defaults the account and 
moves it into active status?” 
“Yes.  The system transfers all accounts that are left in draft status 
overnight into active status.  It does not do that with inactive accounts” 
“Well, surely then, that is our problem?  If the supervisor forgets to 
activate the policy and leaves it in draft status overnight, then the 
account is going to be affected by the system?” 
“Can it be that simple?  How does the policy status affect the EFT 
process?” 
“The system reads the policy from its transaction file, meaning that if 
the policy status has been automatically updated overnight, ASTI reads 
this as a new policy transaction.  So, what happens is that once a file 
changes from inactive status into draft status the system sees the 
‘record’ created as that of a new policy file.  This means that the EFT 
process is ‘triggered’ because it sees the policy as being “new” and so 
the system is designed to recognise this from the movement in the 
transaction file, and “thinks” that it must pull through the first month’s 
premium” 
“Which means that the premium is collected twice?” 



























































































policy as a new transaction” 
“But that’s crazy!” 
“Only if the manual process isn’t what it should be.  Clearly our admin 
processes are causing havoc because they don’t align with the system” 
“So what’s the answer?” 
“I think that we need to take another look at the way in which we follow 
through with our manual process, and if necessary, we need to change 
them” 
“Why haven’t we come across this before?” 
“I really don’t know!  I think this is just another case where, because the 
department’s turnover of staff is so high, the older staff members have 
left a ‘gap’ in our knowledge base.  I mean if I hadn’t been here in this 
dialogue forum, it’s possible that we would still be working on finding a 
possible solution, working in complete isolation from one another.  
Sometimes it helps to know the bigger picture!” 
“So, finally, some credit for being an old hand?” 
“Something like that!” 
“So what happens next?” 
“I want to check our findings with the IT department and make sure we 
are on the right track.  If we are, then we need to revisit our 
endorsement processes and ensure that the necessary changes are 
documented” 
“I will also take a quick look at the current batch and see whether I can 
verify what we have discussed” 
“If this is the problem, and we have the solution, then that will be great!” 



























In this phase of dialogue David Kantor’s “four player system” was again immediately 
discernable (Isaacs, 1999: 49).  Participants interacted with each other through a 
clearly distinguishable pattern of telling / directing [move], agreeing [follow], providing 
alternative perspectives or views, sometimes simply expanding on those articulated by 
others [bystand], and challenging the views already presented [oppose] (pg. 49).  As 
with earlier sessions a fair amount of advocacy (Isaacs, 1999; Schein, 1993) was in 
evidence as individuals periodically presented their ideas and opinions to the forum, 
with much alacrity, persuasion, telling, and directing in evidence (Ellinor and Gerard, 
1998: 21).  This level of engagement elicited a proportionate amount of defending and 
justifying each individual point of view with so-called evidence obtained from personal 
self-reflection (Bohm et al, 1991: 6) based on previous knowledge and experience.  In 
support of this activity participants were seen to expose their explicit thinking to reveal 
and explain their various points of view to one another. 
 
I was able to observe perceptible differences from phase one of dialogue from the point 
of view that participants were seen to make concerted efforts to investigate their 
underlying assumptions by inquiring into them, thereby allowing some measure of 
investigation into recognising or seeing interrelated connections and a holistic view of 
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the issues / problems articulated by the group (Ellinor and Gerard, 1986: 21).  There 
were recognisable attempts, however slight, of wanting to discover each other’s 
perspective and understanding, and an increased “listening” activity, which allowed for 
real learning to become evident as participants began to openly examine their own 
perspectives in the light of others (Isaacs, 1991: 189), and moved towards a more 
encompassing view of the matter at hand. 
 
In the process of learning and discovery through this newly established (for members 
of the group) form of collective inquiry and discourse (Isaacs, 1991: 9, 19; Bohm et al, 
1990: 5; Schein, 1993: 29), participants began to open themselves up to further 
insights provided by individuals within the group, and this led to a series of connections 
(Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 21), which ultimately led to an understanding of the problem 
and a proposed plan of execution to verify their findings by way of eliciting further 
information and support. 
 
Also observed in the process were a series of “touchpoints” which showed an attempt 
to engage in a succession of reflective moments (Habermas in Mezirow, 1991: 104-
111), where participants candidly drew from their individual and collective knowledge 
and experience in directing their own thinking, as well as the collective thoughts of the 
group, to determine the root cause of their issue / problem.  The resultant flow in 
conversation prevented any form of ‘incoherence’ (Isaacs, 1991: 9, 19; Bohm et al, 
1990: 5; Schein, 1993: 29), and participants were seen to build upon the ideas and 
opinions of the group in order to obtain clarity and understanding in the form of a literal 
“think-tank”.  Individuals were able to “listen” (Burbules in Roman, 2005: 19) and 
remain receptive to the directional flow of the conversation, and in so doing build 
towards a constructive engagement and exegesis of the issues at hand. 
 
In the other remaining dialogue session forming part of phase two of dialogue, 
deliberately designed to be an “open” dialogue from the point of view that it did not 
centre around a set of photographs to serve as a catalyst for group interaction but 
rather posed the following open-ended question for participants to consider: Do I have 
a calling to be fully human?, the following picture emerged: 
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[Everyone appears ‘stuck’ once more.  Furtive glances towards one 
another.  They check the whiteboard.  There lies the question: Do I feel 
a calling to be fully human?  They look at me.  No one is rushing each 
other to talk] 
“I don’t understand the question” 
“Me too.  I mean we are all human, aren’t we?  So what do you mean?  
How can we be more fully human than what we already are?” 
[I ask what it means to be human, suggesting that we use this as the 
starting point] 
“I think, for me, being human is defined by the fact that we are able to 
use our reason; we have the ability to think … I guess it is to be more 
than the animals.  We have things like reason, imagination, feelings, 
emotions … something which animals don’t have” 
“Yes.  And each of us makes use of our intellect and our senses 
differently, which is another trait of our humanness.  Animals act and 
behave instinctively, whereas humans are able to modify their 
behaviour” 
“Are we saying that to be human is to belong to the human species, or 
are we saying that there is a difference?  For example, I can say that I 
am human because I am part of the species OR I can say that I feel a 
calling to be human.  For me being human and being called to be 
human are two different things.  Personally, I think that there is a 
difference.  I am human because I belong to a community of humans, 
but I am also human because I behave humanely” 
“I think that it is more than that.  I mean on one level we are compelled 
to act in certain ways precisely because we are humans, such as when 
we instinctively show compassion or emotions … and, on another level 
we have the choice of how we would like to behave … such as when 
we choose to commit murder … this is not an instinctive choice, like the 
animals for their survival, but one which I deliberately choose to make” 
“I don’t know if I agree.  I guess I do and I don’t!  I think that, as 
humans, we instinctively behave like animals sometimes, and at other 
times like human beings … I think we are still evolving and emerging 
from the animal kingdom, so sometimes we show that we are just like 
them, and other times that we are different from them … Does this 
make sense?  Whatever … What I am trying to say is that humans have 
the ability to rise above themselves and even in spite of themselves, but 
that, occasionally, they return to their base-nature and become like 
animals” 
“When we exercise choice, we behave like humans; when we don’t 
exercise choice, we behave like the animals” 
“Whew!  Sounds complicated to me! I reckon that being called to be 
fully human simply means to be able to use our faculties as humans, all 
our human traits and abilities to act and behave in ways that show we 
are superior  …” 
“I am not sure that I see our calling as humans as a calling to being 
superior; not in the sense of being better-than or of being dominant, but 
in the sense of having a higher or more developed consciousness” 
“I like it; if we are to show that we have a more highly developed sense 
of who we are, then we need to think and act in ways that show that we 
are better than the animals.  For me, this is the purest form of being 
called to be fully human and to behave as humans” 
… 
[I ‘challenge’ participants to define human behaviour; I ask whether 
there is a difference between being human and being called to be 
human?] 




















































































































































































to be in relationship with one another.  I think that this is the defining 
issue that differentiates us from the animals; we live in communities and 
so are social creatures.”   
“We belong to a wider community of other people, and by being part of 
a community, we interact ” 
“Is belonging to a community a distinctively human trait?  Animals also 
belong to a community, surely, in the sense that they live together in 
groups in the wild.  I think that belonging to a community is secondary, 
in the sense that like seeks out like.  Animals also belong to a 
community” 
“I would argue that animals not only live in communities but also show 
compassion and emotions, so I am not sure if either of these are strictly 
human behaviours” 
“Honestly?  I think that arguing and debating about animal behaviour 
versus human behaviour isn’t leading anywhere; and it doesn’t help us 
to address the question” 
… 
[A period of silence.  The conversation becomes ‘frozen’ once more.  
No-one appears to be able to take the conversation into a particular 
direction.  I suggest that we take a step back to re-look at what we 
mean by reason, imagination, feelings, emotions … ]  
“I think that because we are so different from each other, we express 
ourselves differently as well.  I mean I have my own feelings and 
emotions, which I suppose are different from yours.  And I will probably 
express them differently to you.  My sadness may lead to tears, yours 
to depression” 
“Well okay!  I guess it will be safe to say that animals probably don’t 
experience depression!  However, I think the conversation is straying 
off the point again.  On a very basic level I think that humans are unique 
from the point of view that they have the freedom to choose any one of 
several ways of expressing themselves.  That is what it means to have 
intellect.  We choose our response.  I honestly don’t think that animals 
can reason in that way.  They behave instinctively.  We behave in ways 
that are controlled by an act of our will” 
“So in other words, we deliberate, we reason, we decide based upon 
our idea of the best option at the time!” 
“I agree.  To be a fully fledged human being implies that I am able to 
choose what is best. This is what makes us different from the animals; 
being fully human means to do and act, as we have already seen, in 
ways that show we are better than animals” 
… 
[I ask whether, by controlling what we do through an act of our will or 
through exercising choice, this places a particular burden or 
responsibility on us as individuals.  How does this relate to whether we 
have a calling to be fully human?] 
“Absolutely!  I think we are obligated to choose whatever seems right or 
appropriate.  I think that our choices have consequences and we are 
obligated to think about the fallout that our actions are likely to cause” 
“It’s like choosing to do what is right; I mean I can do anything I want, 
but everything that I choose to do has wider implications.  If I steal, I 
deprive others, if I vent my anger, I affect those around me … 
everything has a context and I think that being called to be human 
implies that I have a responsibility to act in ways that protect others” 
“Isn’t this what ubuntu is about?  Ubuntu is an ancient word meaning 
‘humanity to others’.  It also means ‘I am what I am because of who we 
all are’” 
“It is an African concept and it means that my behaviour is distinctively 
‘other-person-centred’ in the sense that what I do shows my 
understanding of what it means to be in community with others.  I think 
that it embraces the idea of being in right-standing with my fellow 
human beings and asks of me to ensure that all my actions reflect this” 















































































it points to our dependency on each other, our responsibility as human 
beings, the showing of our emotions, caring and support for one 
another, our values, our morals” 
“To be human is to be in relationship with each other and to show this 
by caring for each other” 
[I ask how this compares with the recent incidents of xenophobia which 
were experienced in South Africa against Zimbabwean refugees.  There 
is a disquieting reaction, as though someone has been caught in the 
head-lamps of a spotlight.  No-one speaks for a while.  There is a short 
embarrassing silence] 
“I think the situation with the Zimbabwean refugees is different.  These 
people are causing conflict in our country, they are involved with crime 



















In this dialogue session participants appeared to experience difficulty in finding a 
common voice (Isaacs, 1991: 9, 19; Bohm et al, 1990: 5; Schein, 1993: 29) in the 
sense that individuals’ engaged in the advocacy (Ellinor and Gerard, 1998: 21) of their 
own personal perceptions (Isaacs, 1991: 188) and insights without really listening to 
each other (Burbules in Roman, 2005: 19).  The session was marked by momentary 
points of incoherence (Isaacs, 1991: 9, 19; Bohm et al, 1990: 5; Schein, 1993: 29) as 
the conversation struggled to emerge following a common and logical thread of 
development, vacillating between perceived human behaviours and animal behaviours, 
periodically threatening to become a discussion / debate about the differences between 
the two.  Participants were, seemingly, inattentive to the question, and were unable to 
provide any real evidence of reflection (Habermas in Mezirow, 1991: 104-111) upon 
the topic, either individually or collectively.  This aspect was sharply highlighted in 
individual attempts, or rather the lack of it, to objectively reflect upon the aspect of 
ubuntu and its implications for the xenophobic incidents which were introduced into the 
discussion to crystallise participants’ understanding of the concept. 
 
Whilst David Kantor’s “four player system” was again observed to be strongly in 
evidence among participants (Isaacs, 1999: 192-3), it was interesting to note that their 
emerging pattern suggested an inability to provide strong momentum and development 
beyond individual’s being moved to contribute their views and thereby direct the flow of 
conversation, only to be repeatedly opposed and challenged.  In failing to listen to one 
another, individuals were unable to establish a common thread or elicit an explicit and 
collective thinking pattern.  In the final analysis the dialogue was unable to find its own 
inherent direction, and meaningful dialogue was not found to be in evidence. 
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4.2.4  Non-Reflective Action And Reflective Action: 
 
4.2.4.1 Phase 1 Of Dialogue: 
 
In the earlier dialogue sessions (prelude to dialogue) discussion was disoriented as 
participants strove to make their own perspectives more explicit through vigorous 
displays of advocacy.  Initiatives were continuously disrupted by the failure of 
participants to listen to one another, which finally ended in bouts of incoherence and 
frustration.  There was no real evidence of either non-reflective action or reflective 
action (Habermas quoted in Mezirow, 1991: 104-111). 
 
In phase one of dialogue conversation focused on several attempts to validate or 
defend personal perspectives and theories, in the expression of alternative views 
through advocacy (telling, selling), questioning, breaking down concepts and ideas into 
their constituent parts, and plenty of challenge.  Interaction gave rise to the display of 
significant evidence to corroborate and confirm the presence of the dynamic 
associated with Kantor’s four-player system in action (move, follow, oppose and 
bystand), there was still no evidence to suggest any form of non-reflective action or 
reflective action had taken place. 
 
4.2.4.2 Phase 2 Of Dialogue: 
 
In phase two of dialogue the data collected evidenced two differing sets of behaviour 
by participants:- 
 
In the first “sessions” which were conducted there was a string of evidence to support 
the emergence of non-reflective action and reflective action.  Participants were 
engaged in conversations that not only required their own explicit thinking mixed with 
validation of personal and individual theory through advocacy, but also a collective 
discovery of aspects which were unknown, at least by some, stimulated by bouts of 
collective thinking, reflecting, talking together and learning.  Individuals provided 
evidence that as a group they began to draw from their individual and collective 
learning (knowledge), which they were able to reflect upon and allow the group to 
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access their collective intelligence.  An analysis of these findings, however, shows that 
only two forms of what Habermas refers to as “thoughtful action” (pg. 104) were in 
evidence: 
 
1. Non-reflective action or thoughtful action applied to content presented within the 
group, which draws from prior knowledge or experience to confirm or refute 
additional points or aspects raised by participants, but which does NOT require 
any form of appraisal or re-appraisal of the ‘ground’ upon which to base one’s 
decision (no form of validity testing); 
2. Reflective action which was applied to the content of the discussion on several 
occasions by the group, allowing them to reflect and question ways of doing 
things that ultimately led to questions around an action or series of actions 
performed within a particular process (EFT, ASTI, VPMS) in order to examine 
their effectiveness. 
 
In subsequent sessions participants, disappointingly, quickly returned to their old 
familiar ways of doing things and the resulting conversation devolved into a period of 
deep self-reflection, individual advocacy, challenge and varying forms of incoherence 
and frustration.  In large measure the group appeared to mirror the behaviour recorded 
in earlier sessions and would appear to indicate that the newly discovered principles or 
‘best practice’ associated with meaning conversation and/or dialogue and been quickly 
unlearned.  Frustratingly, evidence collected pointed to the reality that, given the 
appropriate opportunity and circumstance, the practice of reflection as portrayed in the 
works of Jürgen Habermas, would not, necessarily, be guaranteed. 
 
4.3 The Conversations Outside The Room: 
 
In tandem with the dialogues themselves it became apparent that groups of individuals 
were getting together at random to engage in conversations ‘outside the room’.  The 
nature of these discourses is not documented and I was not invited to be part of their 
development.  In later interviews with some of the participants I was able to establish 
that individuals met to discuss points of interest or to continue those conversations that 
were introduced ‘inside the room’.  According to one account, corroborated to a large 
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extent by others, it quickly became apparent that the discussions within the room had 
stirred individuals into action: 
 
Nkuli: We realised that our situation at the office was of our own making … and so 
some of us started doing something about it.  We realised that we could 
make the difference.  And so we decided to work over weekends, 
sometimes overnight, and got rid of the backlog.  It was as if something in 
the dialogue sessions had stirred us into action.  We became aware of what 
we could do. (Interview, I20079). 
    
Several individuals sought to create opportunities for decisive action and working 
groups were formed to address some of the areas identified in the photographs that 
had been taken.  The untidiness within the office was tackled, arrangements made to 
remove the storage boxes, individuals held to account for their absenteeism, some of 
the internal daily processes challenged and moderated or changed.      
 
Some participants revealed how the sessions had affected what they thought they 
knew of themselves and others: 
 
Lerato: I realised something.  That I was the only one who could give away my 
power to someone else.  The discussion in the room made me think about 
the power that all of us had given away to our managers and supervisors; 
and to white people in general.  I suddenly realised that I actually had the 
power now, but that somehow my perceptions were stuck in the past, in 
apartheid, in the belief that I was powerless.  These sessions made me see 
that if I wanted to take control I could, and that I had to deal with the past.  I 
saw that I would have to challenge more, do more to make my voice heard, 
and that it was okay for me to do so. (Interview, I20077). 
    
The resulting conduct by Lerato and those who were engaging in similar lines of 
reasoning led to more overt challenges being directed at authority and greater 
participation in issues that affected the daily operations. 
 
Nkuli: We challenged ourselves and our supervisors in different ways.  Sometimes 
this led to positive changes, other times it created greater division and 
animosity.  What was important for us, however, is that we had found our 
voices.  We felt liberated. (Interview, I20079). 
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What transpired led to what I have referred to as the ‘outer conversations’ initiated by 
those who were not part of the conversation inside the room, nor those ‘outside the 
room’, but who nevertheless held views about what was happening due to the fact that 
they had been affected by the dialogues.  
 
4.4 The Outer Conversations: 
 
These conversations were, in large measure, held by those directly affected by what 
was happening as a result of the dialogues, such as line managers and head office 
staff, and only became apparent much later during the process.  I was unaware of 
them until it seemed that a decision had been taken to dissolve the dialogue groups.  I 
was later able to interview one manager who had been involved in the decision-making 
process: 
 
Andre: The dialogues were starting to become contentious.  It became apparent to 
us that they were developing into nothing more than ‘gripe’ sessions, where 
everyone just complained and criticized.  Staff suddenly felt that they had 
the right to challenge everything without making the effort to understand the 
larger implications of what they were trying to do.  In the end it was safer for 
all concerned to stop what was happening.  (Interview, I20079). 
    
Andre’s perspective was not isolated and it became clear that a certain level of 
discomfort was being experienced by some who believed that the disadvantages of 
allowing the dialogues to continue outweighed the advantages. 
 
In following this line of thought it became difficult to obtain a balanced picture of the 
reality that was being experienced ‘on the ground’.  Participants acknowledged that 
there had been changes to the way that some interacted with peers and immediate 
superiors, but felt that the changes were positive: 
 
Ntuli: People’s comfort zones were definitely being challenged, and yes, 
sometimes confrontation might have gotten out of hand, but not because 
staff were unaware or unsure of the bigger picture.  (Interview, I200711). 
    
In “corridor conversations” in and around the floors, opinions were mixed and it was 
difficult trying to establish an exact version of events and of the wider perceptions from 
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management and others.  I chose not to pursue this line of enquiry further, believing 
that there was no longer any merit in doing so when it became conclusive that the 




In summation of the research findings I have chosen to rank the information through a 
simple information table by narrative and observation, shown by way of a yes (√), no 
(א) and indeterminate (±) indicator.  In this way it is possible to trace the various 
nuances of dialogue that were found to be present whilst at the same time provide a 
reliable estimate of the degree (percentage) to which the practice of dialogue was 
evident.  In so doing it is not intended to reduce the significance of the findings into 
percentages, but rather to provide an insight into their arguable and recognisable 
presence during each session, albeit to a larger or lesser degree.  The goal of the 
study was to explore and expose a particular model of dialogue which, in the words of 
Schein (1993) is “different from good face-to-face communication of the sort we learn 
in group dynamics and human relations workshops” (Schein, 1991: 30). 
 
Thus I strive to show the unfolding nature of dialogue as observed to be present within 
each session, through a series of recognisable criteria which support the existence of 
an overarching theme or category of conversation identified as the elements of 
dialogue as proposed by Schein (1993) and Isaacs (1991).  My hope, in doing so, is to 
acknowledge the nuances of conversation whose constituent elements make up the 
























































































































































Dialogue as language -     
The choice of language we use א √ א √ א
The context in which the language is used -   
- historical א √ א √ א
- political א √ א √ א
- social א √ א √ א
The language of listening א א א √ א
2 
Dialogue as relationship      
I-IT relationship א √ ± √ א
I-THOU relationship א א ± √ א
Horizontal relationship   
- mutual trust א א א √ א
- humility א א א √ א
- faith א א א √ א
3 
Dialogue as communally constructed -      
- thinking together א א א √ א
- reflecting together א א א √ א
- talking together א א א √ א
(absence = incoherence) √ √ √ א √
4 
Dialogue as consciousness of -      
- complexities of thinking א א א ± א
- complexities of language א א א ± א
- imperfections of bias א א א ± א
 
5 
Dialogue as reflective enquiry      
- balancing advocacy with inquiry א א √ √ א
- explicit thinking א √ √ √ √
4 Dialogue as fellowship      - Impersonal fellowship א א ± √ א
5 Theories of action (espoused) א א א √ אTheories in action (used) √ √ א ± א
6 
Self-reflection -      
Seeing one’s own perceptions √ √ √ √ √
Seeing one’s own assumptions √ √ √ √ √
7 
Dialogue (characteristics)      
Seeing the whole among the parts א א ± √ ±
Seeing the connection between the parts א א ± √ ±
Inquiring into assumptions א א ± √ א
Learning through enquiry and disclosure א א א √ א
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8 
Discussion / debate (characteristics)      
Breaking issues / problems into parts √ √ √ א √
Seeing distinctions between the parts √ √ √ א √
Justifying / defending assumptions √ √ √ א √
Persuading, selling, telling √ √ √ א √
Gaining agreement on one meaning √ √ √ א √
9 David Kantor’s four-player system 
- move √ √ √ √ √
- follow א √ √ √ √
- oppose א א √ √ √
- bystand א א √ √ √
 Observable traces of dialogue encountered 
during the dialogue sessions (expressed in 
percentages) 
14% 34% 46% 85% 26% 
 
 
These findings suggest that the company’s current understanding and practice of 
dialogue is inadequate when measured against the standards and criteria of ‘best 
practice’ enunciated by the models of Isaacs (1999) and Schein (1993), and therefore 
‘unsuccessful’. 
 
On the other hand they provide evidence of an emerging dialogue which can be 
learned and which holds encouraging possibilities for its future implementation and 
‘success’. 
 
In the final analysis, however, the data must of necessity be viewed together, and 
when seen from this perspective, the evidence points overwhelmingly to several 
determining factors which have successfully thwarted the implementation of the 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion And Comment 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The results of the case study are not entirely unexpected.  They reveal a composite 
picture, albeit a disparate one, of dialogue as practiced within the organisation, which 
shows that effective and meaningful communication is currently being hampered by 
several barriers.  These barriers serve to immunise the organisation against 
successfully tapping into their collective potential and, moreover, prevent it from 
arriving at a common platform of working and engaging with one another. 
 
5.2 Organisational Barriers To Dialogue: 
 
5.2.1 The Historical Legacy Of The Past: 
 
During the dialogue sessions it became apparent that participants were unable to 
interact with one another without unwittingly becoming embroiled in the “social 
discourses” of the past.  It was as if the “discursive tensions”, spoken of by Bakhtin 
(Bakhtin quoted in Hamston, 2006: 57), naturally arose, and were appropriated, 
internalised and adopted by individuals during the dialogue process.   It became 
necessary to allow the group to express their feelings, however real or imagined, and 
to create opportunities for a change in consciousness and perspectives, through self-
reflection and interaction with others within the group, before making any further 
progress.  As an observer of this unfolding dynamic I was made aware of the need of 
some participants to deal with the ‘social debris’ borne of apartheid, and that failing to 
do so would impair the quality of any continued interaction within the group. 
 
Equally apparent, however, was the sad reality that participants were not given the 
necessary platform or opportunity to comprehensively tackle the issues which they 
knowingly or unknowingly associated with the legacy of the past, without appearing to 
others as being overly contentious or critical.  And it remains inconclusive as to 
0608395V - Masters Thesis – J Marais 85
whether this perception may or may not have contributed to a management decision to 
terminate the sessions.       
 
5.2.2 The Equality Dynamic: 
 
Participants were affected by what could be described as a collective form of 
disassociation through the perception, however formed or created, that they were 
somehow ‘less than’ others.  The disparity between employees with positional power 
(supervisors and managers) as opposed to those without (administrators) was tangible 
and its existence led to further divisions. Sometimes participants identified the same 
division between those with knowledge and those who were regarded as being without 
knowledge, which served as a powerful differentiator among participants, leading to the 
need to examine the ground upon which such perceptions had been based so as to 
vouchsafe their validity or otherwise.  The effect that this was having upon the 
“conversation within the room” was that participants appeared immobilised to the 
extent that they were silenced and restricted from engaging with one another, and 
thereby exhibited a disproportionate amount of passivity.  Dialogue within this 
framework was laboured and required continual coaxing and encouragement from the 
facilitator. 
 
Sadly, the further exploration of this issue was curtailed, once again, by managements’ 
ending of the dialogue sessions.  The feeling of inequality by participants of 
extemporaneous or organised dialogue raises far-reaching concerns that ought to be 
explored and challenged.  Adam Kahane, in his work with political movements 
throughout Africa and South America, draws a significant parallel between 
dictatorships and organisational authoritarianism which include “silence and 
subservience, through coercion, seduction and corruption” (Kahane, 2004: 48). 
 
One of the ways in which Kahane argues that this becomes apparent is by virtue of the 
fact that in a dictatorship or authoritarian style of management the dictator/authoritarian 
“does not listen, and the people are afraid to talk” (Kahane, 2004: 47).  He goes on to 
explain “The root of not listening is knowing.  If you already know the truth, why do I 
need to listen to you?  Perhaps out of politeness or guile I should pretend to listen, but 
what I really need to do is to tell you what I know, and if you don’t listen, to tell you 
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again, more forcefully.  All authoritarian systems rest on the assumption that the boss 
can and does know the one right answer” (pg. 47). 
 
Enough evidence in the dialogue sessions (cf extracts in the prelude to dialogue, 
dialogue on fear and others) suggest that an unseen dynamic holding the tenure and 
fabric of the conversation was, undoubtedly, at play.  Further, the subdued and polite 
manner in which several conversations were conducted lend themselves to another 
corollary of authoritarianism referred to by Kahane as politeness which is seen as a 
way of not talking, “When we are being polite, we say what we think we should say… 
We do not say what we are really thinking because we are afraid of a social rupture” 
(pg. 56). 
 
This aspect of the research findings are incomplete in the sense that they are 
uncorroborated by further engagement with the participants themselves due to the 
premature and untimely cessation of the dialogue sessions.     
 
5.2.3 The Effects Of Over-Performativity: 
 
Individuals appeared to have become ‘paralysed’ in that their interaction with one 
another was prevented from functioning effectively, due to a perception that they were 
being continually measured against levels of productivity or standards of quality that 
were unattainable; the net effect of which set in motion the ground for a plethora of 
internal struggles of self-worth and self-worth that impacted directly upon an 
individual’s ability to interact with others.  Stephen Bell (2003) describes perfomativity 
as “a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, 
comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change – based 
upon rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic)” (Bell, 2003: 216).  The 
sense that I, as an observer, gained by examining participants’ behaviour within the 
group, was that an over-emphasis on levels of so-called ‘desired’ performance had had 
the effect of debilitating individual’s perceptions of themselves to the point that they felt 
unable to engage feely with each other. 
 
The very idea that there exists a series of overt standards by which to gauge 
performance can also be viewed as a subtle form of brutality and echoes another of 
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Kahane’s findings within authoritarian contexts where the CEO of a Fortune 100 
company was seen as a brilliant man and a ‘bully’ (Kahane, 2004: 48), whose senior 
managers admired and feared him, spending their time “looking over their shoulders, 
worrying about how to keep him happy” (pg. 49).  Kahane likens this form of ‘control’ as 
“the corporate version of the apartheid syndrome: management of a complex system 
by force and fear” (pg. 49). 
 
Is this, perhaps, what was being experienced by participants?  A form of control that 
was experienced as an overt paralysis brought about by a perceived inability to 
contribute meaningfully to a series of imposed standards?  A fuller investigation of the 
phenomenon is required, however tenuously suggestive the idea appears to be that it 
was and, possibly, still is.    
 
5.2.4 The Strictures Of A Particular Management Style: 
 
It became fairly obvious throughout the dialogue process that participants were feeling 
the effects of an over-bearing authoritarian style of management which made it difficult 
for them to engage with others.  
 
In my own observation participants found it difficult to engage within a framework of 
possibility that allowed for individual expressions of perspective, knowledge, 
understanding, and influence.  Their ‘right to be heard’ (voice) was overshadowed by 
their perceptions of the need for control and domination from those in positions of 
management and leadership.  This latter aspect has already received some attention 
(above) and emphasises the destabilising effects upon individuals “within the room”, 
whose interaction became “closed” and “guarded” until they were suitably convinced 
through practice that the current initiative was pointing to a different dynamic, which 
encouraged their participation.   
 
An authoritarian style of management guarantees speaking in a closed and guarded 
fashion which ultimately “obscures the problem and keeps it stuck’ (Kahane, 2004: 57) 
because there is no basis upon which the conversation can, of its own volition, find 
ways of deepening.  Kahane contends that this inability to deepen conversations 
causes individuals and teams alike to avoid exploring and discovering the mutual 
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ground which they hold in common (pg. 57) and this in turn leads to “polite 
conversations” (see above) that serve to steer away from sensitive topics or people so 
as to maintain a veneer of control and ensure the status quo within organisations (pg. 
57). 
 
Paulo Freire (1970) attributes the lack of dialogue to a deliberate form of oppression 
that seeks to ensure the status quo by denying individuals the right to reflection and 
action.  He contends that “In order to dominate, the dominator has no choice but to 
deny true praxis to the people, deny them the right to say their own word and think their 
own thoughts.  He or she cannot act dialogically; for to do so would mean that they had 
relinquished their power to dominate” (Freire, 1970: 107).  For Freire, it was absolutely 
necessary for individuals to participate through a process of engagement and critique 
which he saw as a necessary corollary to the mere act of being human, the absence of 
which was a form of dehumanisation leading to an existential dichotomy and duality 
imposed by those in authority or ‘oppressors. 
 
These are weighty concepts and they deserve further examination and exploration.           
 
5.3 Practical Hindrances To Successful Implementation: 
 
In addition to the observed barriers to dialogue, participants provided enough evidence 
to suggest that their ability to provide a sustained practice of dialogue was 
questionable.  The data collected in subsequent dialogue sessions appear to 
corroborate the notion that, once learned, an understanding of best practice dialogue 
principles was not enough to guarantee success.  Something more was required and I 
have isolated a few of my own suggestions to the observable barriers to dialogue 
based upon my own experience of the dialogue encounters themselves:-    
 
5.3.1 The Rules Of Protocol: 
 
The dialogue process or, in simpler terms, the rules of engagement that allow for 
positive interaction to take place among participants, needed to be learned and 
developed; they were neither instinctive nor natural for dialoguers.  It became clear that 
for dialogue to be considered successful a framework for participation was required; 
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the tenets of which needed to be continually and successively lifted up for participants 
to be reminded of and held accountable to.  Without this, subsequent attempts at 
dialogue were fraught with potential for failure, as corroborated in later sessions. 
 
5.3.2 The Role Of Facilitation: 
 
The use of an experienced and informed practitioner of the dialogue process appears 
to become salient if dialogue is to succeed within organisations.  The data collected 
suggests that throughout the dialogue encounters, participants required continual 
support and direction in terms of realising and understanding how they were expected 
to engage with each other and what was required of them to ensure that the dialogue 
encounter was successful.  A facilitator acts as a neutral enabler of the interactive 
process and is continuously needed and required to smooth the progress of the 
conversation that takes place “within the room”. 
 
5.3.3 The Creation Of Opportunity: 
 
In order for dialogue ultimately to thrive and to take root within organisations, the data 
collected appears to support the view that its success, in large measure, is 
proportionate to its practice.  In other words, the only way to become experienced and 
knowledgeable about the tenets and principles of best practice, is to create the contact 
and the context for regular dialogue encounters to take place. In this respect the old 
adage that ‘practice makes perfect’ is, indeed, true.  
 
5.4. Closing Thoughts: 
 
The publisher’s foreword to Paulo Freire’s treatise on “Pedagogy of The Oppressed” 
(1970) states simply that “The methodology Paulo Freire developed, once considered 
such a threat to the established order that he was forced to leave Brazil for some 
twenty years before returning to Sao Paulo” (Freire, 1970: 9). 
 
I cannot help but become drawn to these words in the aftermath of witnessing the 
closure of the dialogue sessions by management, in spite of evidence which seemed to 
suggest that their ongoing development was and held the continued promise of some 
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worthwhile benefits.  I would have valued the opportunity to explore issues relating to 
gender relations, which received scant attention, and the power-political relations, 
which were decidedly evident and which seemed to dominate proceedings, whilst, in 
the end, appearing somewhat limp against the eventual findings of the research due to 
the loss of opportunity and clarity by means of further investigation and exploration. 
 
I feel, somehow, cheated, and am still left, therefore, with a keen sense of the 
possibilities that the use of dialogue in any context can provide.  Freire’s voice 
continues to echo in my mind and, if nothing else, his belief “that every human being, 
no matter how “ignorant” or submerged in the “culture of silence” he or she may be is 
capable of looking critically at the world in a dialogical encounter with others” (pg. 14) 
causes me to remain optimistic and buoyed by the prospect that a significant amount of 
exploration still needs to be carried out around this topic, and I hold out for the prospect 
that this research report does enough justice to serve as a torch-bearer for future 
researchers to take up the challenge.    
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